Requirements

BSI-eRp-ePA

O.Arch_1

Original Requirement

Implementation

See external SSDLC documentation.

O.Arch_2

Original Requirement

Implementation

See external Data and Security concept.

O.Arch_3

Original Requirement

Implementation

All cryptography is specified by gemSpec_Krypt in corporation with BSI

O.Arch_4

Original Requirement

Implementation

All data is either stored encrypted within the keychain or excluded from system backup, which also excludes files from cloud backup.

../Sources/eRpLocalStorage/CoreDataController.swift:83

Database backup exclusion

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_8#4,O.Arch_4#2,O.Data_15#1] Database backup exclusion
if excludeFromBackup, let storeUrl = store.url {

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:21

Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19186]
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19188] Deletion of data saved here is managed by the OS.
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21322] Storage implementation uses iOS Keychain
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21595] Storage Implementation
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_8#1,O.Arch_4#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_7#2,O.Data_2#2,O.Auth_13#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
class KeychainStorage: SecureUserDataStore, IDPStorage, SecureEGKCertificateStorage {

O.Arch_5

Original Requirement

Implementation

CAN and PIN verification is not done within the application but on the eGK chip. Actual authentication by confirming the eGK signature and validating the eGK certificate is done by the IDP. Authorization of users is done by the FD by validating the Access-Token signature. For Input-Validation and Escaping please see O.Source_1 and O.Source_2.

O.Arch_6

Original Requirement

Implementation

Apple already implements this with a signed binary delivered to customers. An altered application can only run on a jailbroken device. If a user is using a jailbroken device, may it be known or unknown, we display a security alert so a user can make an informed decision to use or not use the application.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/MainView.swift:95

trigger device security check

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_6#2,O.Resi_2#2,O.Plat_1#2] trigger device security check
store.send(.loadDeviceSecurityView)

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/Helper/DeviceSecurityManager.swift:58

calculate system risk for jailbreak and missing device pin

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_6#3,O.Resi_2#3,O.Plat_1#3] calculate system risk for jailbreak and missing device pin
var showSystemSecurityWarning: AnyPublisher<DeviceSecurityWarningType, Never> {

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/Helper/DeviceSecurityManager.swift:112

Jailbreak detection

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_6#4,O.Resi_2#4] Jailbreak detection
func informJailbreakDetected() -> Bool {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/DeviceSecurity/DeviceSecurityRootedDevice/DeviceSecurityRootedDeviceView.swift:9

Jailbreak information view

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_6#5,O.Resi_2#5] Jailbreak information view
struct DeviceSecurityRootedDeviceView: View {

O.Arch_7

Original Requirement

Implementation

See Source/eRpApp/Resources/en.lproj/FOSS.html for library usage purposes. We use Swift as our programming language. We do not use reflections for calling a businesslogic. That’s why we can be sure, that library code (that we do not use) cannot be executed.

O.Arch_8

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/TermsOfUse/TermsOfUseView.swift:12

Webview containing local html without javascript

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_3#2] Actual view for the Terms of Use display
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_8#1] Webview containing local html without javascript
struct TermsOfUseView: View {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/FOSS/FOSSView.swift:10

Webview containing local html without javascript

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_8#2] Webview containing local html without javascript
struct FOSSView: View {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/DataPrivacy/DataPrivacyView.swift:13

Webview containing local html without javascript

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_1#2] Actual View driving the display of `DataPrivacy.html`
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_8#3] Webview containing local html without javascript
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19980#2] Actual View driving the display of `DataPrivacy.html`
struct DataPrivacyView: View {

O.Arch_9

Original Requirement

Implementation

Link within DataPrivacy.html to https://www.gematik.de/datensicherheit

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingContainer.swift:46

DataPrivacy display within Onboarding

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_9#2] DataPrivacy display within Onboarding
.sheet(isPresented: $store.showTermsOfPrivacy.sending(\.setShowPrivacy)) {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsLegalInfoView.swift:28

DataPrivacy display within Settings

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_9#3,O.Purp_1#4] DataPrivacy display within Settings
NavigationLink(

O.Arch_10

Original Requirement

Implementation

Implemented via APIKey usage against APOVZD and FD. All requests against the backends may respond with an 403 status code. The App stays usable, but only without any server connection. The user is informed, that an update is required.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/MainView.swift:91

Trigger for the update check

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_10#2] Trigger for the update check
await store.send(.checkForForcedUpdates).finish()

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/MainDomain.swift:227

The actual business logic for the update check

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_10#3] The actual business logic for the update check
return .run(operation: { [updateChecked = state.updateChecked] send in

O.Arch_11

Original Requirement

Implementation

Sole source for the app is the official Apple AppStore. Apple provides a secure ecosystem for downloading applications that incorporate signing and verification of the application. The app is only available in the AppStore and not in any other store.

O.Arch_12

Original Requirement

Implementation

Not applicable as we are only using the official Apple AppStore.

O.Auth_1

Original Requirement

Implementation

Our authentication concept is described in the following repository: https://github.com/gematik/api-erp/blob/master/docs/authentisieren.adoc. Roles in the scope of the IDP are defined in https://gemspec.gematik.de/docs/gemSpec/gemSpec_IDP_Dienst/latest/#3.1. As stated in O.Auth_14, we have no mechanism to invalidate tokens.

O.Auth_2

Original Requirement

Implementation

There is no client side separation of authentication and authorization.

O.Auth_3

Original Requirement

Implementation

One way to connect to the FD is to login by using the eGK. For that login, the physical card, as well as knowledge of the PIN is required. Login via gID (Gesundheits ID) is described in O.Auth_4.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/CardWallReadCardDomain.swift:182

Implementation of eGK connection

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_3#2] Implementation of eGK connection
case let .signChallenge(challenge):

O.Auth_4

Original Requirement

Implementation

Authentication via gID (Gesundheits ID) is possible. To do that an inter-app flow is used that opens the insurance company app on the users device, and after successfull authentication there, jumps back into the E-Rezept-App.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/Introduction/CardWallIntroductionView.swift:125

Button the user may use to start login via gID

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_4#2] Button the user may use to start login via gID
Button(action: {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/Introduction/CardWallIntroductionDomain.swift:154

Present the gID flow for selecting the correct insurance company

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_4#3] Present the gID flow for selecting the correct insurance company
.extAuthTapped:

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ExtAuth/CardWallExtAuthSelectionView.swift:12

View containing the list of insurance companies

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_4#4] View containing the list of insurance companies
struct CardWallExtAuthSelectionView: View {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ExtAuth/CardWallExtAuthSelectionView.swift:52

User selection of the insurance company

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_4#5] User selection of the insurance company
Button(action: {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ExtAuth/CardWallExtAuthSelectionDomain.swift:90

Business logic of user selecting the insurance company

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_4#6] Business logic of user selecting the insurance company
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22294-01] Select KK
state.selectedKK = entry

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ExtAuth/CardWallExtAuthSelectionDomain.swift:93

Proceed to confirmation screen

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_4#7] Proceed to confirmation screen
case .confirmKK:

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ExtAuth/CardWallExtAuthConfirmationView.swift:10

Confirmation Dialog with brief explanation

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_4#8] Confirmation Dialog with brief explanation
struct CardWallExtAuthConfirmationView: View {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ExtAuth/CardWallExtAuthConfirmationView.swift:72

User confirms the insurance company

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_4#8] User confirms the insurance company
PrimaryTextButton(text: L10n.cdwBtnExtauthConfirmSend,

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ExtAuth/CardWallExtAuthConfirmationDomain.swift:91

Start login via gID

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22294-01] Start login via gID
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_4#9,O.Plat_10#2] Start login via gID
return .publisher(

O.Auth_5

Original Requirement

Implementation

If the registered biometric features get changed (within system settings), private keys for alternate authentication are deleted. For privacy reasons, neither the FD nor the application gather or store user data that is not crutial, e.g. the current WiFi.

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:133

Key invalidates on changes of registered

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21586] invalidates biometry after changes
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_5#2] Key invalidates on changes of registered
// biometric features
.biometryCurrentSet], &error) else {

O.Auth_6

Original Requirement

Implementation

We increment a counter whenever the application is opened and an attempt to unlock the application fails. If the counter is greater than 0, the user is informed about that in a hint on the password/unlock screen. For remote logins, an Audit Log for every FD access is available in each user profile.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/Profiles/Edit/EditProfileView.swift:401

Actual Button to open the audit events

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19177#2,A_19185#3] Actual Button to open the audit events
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_6#2] Actual Button to open the audit events
NavigationLink(item: $store.scope(state: \.destination?.auditEvents,

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/Profiles/Protocol/AuditEventsView.swift:13

View displaying the audit events

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19177#1,A_19185#2] View displaying the audit events
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_6#3] View displaying the audit events
struct AuditEventsView: View {

O.Auth_7

Original Requirement

Implementation

There are no passwords to guess for server login within our application. Only eGK login is directly available within the application. The users application password is not delayed, as any user with Device-PIN access would have access to the unencrypted file system as well.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/AppAuthentication/AppAuthenticationPassword/AppAuthenticationPasswordDomain.swift:8

Domain handling App Authentication

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_7#2] Domain handling App Authentication
@Reducer

O.Auth_8

Original Requirement

Implementation

The SceneDelegate exchanges the active window with an authentication window, every time the app gains focus.

../Sources/eRpApp/SceneDelegate.swift:179

Present the authentication window

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_8#2] Present the authentication window
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_24857#2] Present the authentication window upon every startup
// dispatching necessary to prevents keyboard not showing on iOS 16
DispatchQueue.main.async { [weak self] in

O.Auth_9

Original Requirement

Implementation

A Timer is used to measure the time a user is inactive. Every user interaction resets the timer.

../Sources/eRpApp/SceneDelegate.swift:337

The timer used to determine inactivity

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_9#2] The timer used to determine inactivity
self?.presentAppAuthenticationDomain(scene: scene)

../Sources/eRpApp/SceneDelegate.swift:318

The timer is reset on user interaction

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_9#3] The timer is reset on user interaction
self?.setupTimer(scene: scene)

../Sources/eRpApp/SceneDelegate.swift:347

User interaction is determined by using a higher order reducer watching all

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_9#4] User interaction is determined by using a higher order reducer watching all
// actions
NotificationCenter.default.post(name: .userInteractionDetected, object: nil, userInfo: nil)

../Sources/eRpApp/SceneDelegate.swift:47

Concat the user interaction reducer to the normal application reducer

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_9#5] Concat the user interaction reducer to the normal application reducer
reducer: AppStartDomain().analytics().notifyUserInteraction().prepareUITestsDependencies(),

O.Auth_10

Original Requirement

Implementation

Token invalidation happens after 12 hours. If a user is still active, a re-authentication via eGK, Biometrics or Insurance App is necessary. Each meaning the possession and or knowledge of the needed user input.

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:784

The application is also checking for Access-Token expiration

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_10#2] The application is also checking for Access-Token expiration
guard token.expires > time() else {

O.Auth_11

Original Requirement

Implementation

Authentication via eGK cannot be altered, as the physical card cannot be modified without authentication (e.g. PIN change). See gemSpec_COS for details. Adding a authentication key that is secured via biometrics (labeled as “save login” within the card wall) enforces a new authentication via eGK on server side. There is no other way to change existing login “credentials”, as there is no “password”.

O.Auth_12

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use TI Certificate Pinning and a Trust Store for VAU communication. See TrustStore and VAU Module for implementation.

O.Auth_13

Original Requirement

Implementation

Session tokens and related data are stored within the keychain. We embrace a protocol specifically made for storing data that needs to be secured.

../Sources/eRpKit/SecureUserDataStore.swift:15

The protocol for storing secured data

/// Interface to access user specific data that should be kept private
/// sourcery: StreamWrapped
/// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_13#2|11] The protocol for storing secured data
public protocol SecureUserDataStore: IDPStorage, SecureEGKCertificateStorage {
    /// Set the CAN
    ///
    /// - Parameter can: the CAN to set and save
    func set(can: String?)

    /// Wipe the whole storage and delete all user information
    func wipe()
}

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:22

Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19186]
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19188] Deletion of data saved here is managed by the OS.
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21322] Storage implementation uses iOS Keychain
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21595] Storage Implementation
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_8#1,O.Arch_4#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_7#2,O.Data_2#2,O.Auth_13#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
class KeychainStorage: SecureUserDataStore, IDPStorage, SecureEGKCertificateStorage {

O.Auth_14

Original Requirement

Implementation

Our Authentication Tokens cannot be invalidated effectivley as they are stateless and no server stores active/valid tokens anywhere. Invalidating Authentication Tokens in our context means deleting them on client side. The client side invalidation can thus be done by manual logout or profile deletion. Logout is accessible within the Settings -> Specific User Profile -> Logout.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/Profiles/Edit/EditProfileView.swift:179

The user may use the logout button within each profile

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_14#2|5] The user may use the logout button within each profile
Button(action: {
    store.send(.delegate(.logout))
}, label: {
    Text(L10n.stgBtnEditProfileLogout)
})

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/Profiles/Edit/EditProfileDomain.swift:252

The domain accepts the intent and wipes tokens and other login related data

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_14#3|6] The domain accepts the intent and wipes tokens and other login related data
case .delegate(.logout):
    state.token = nil
    // [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20499-01#1] Call the SSO_TOKEN removal upon manual logout
    return .run { [profileId = state.profileId] _ in
        try await profileSecureDataWiper.wipeSecureData(of: profileId).async()
    }

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/ProfileSecureDataWiper.swift:43

Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20499,A_20499-01#2] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20186] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21603] Certificate
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_14#4] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
storage.wipe()

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:244

Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_14#5|11] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
func wipe() {
    // [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20499,A_20499-1#3] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
    // [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20186] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
    set(can: nil)
    set(token: nil)
    set(discovery: nil)
    // [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21603] Certificate
    set(certificate: nil)
    // `keyIdentifier` is not wiped here because it's deletion is done asynchronously
    // together with the secure enclave representative in `ProfileSecureDataWiper`
}

O.Auth_15

Original Requirement

Implementation

Our Authentication Tokens cannot be invalidated effectivley as they are stateless and no server stores active/valid tokens anywhere. Invalidating Authentication Tokens in our context means deleting them on client side. The client side invalidation can thus be done by manual logout or profile deletion. Logout is accessible within the Settings -> Specific User Profile -> Logout.

O.Cryp_1

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use API-Keys for FD and APOVZD communication for legal reasons, not for security reasons. Besides that, private keys for encryption are either created and stored within the secure enclave or stored within the eGK. As encryption for Server communication is done ephemeral via ECDH-ES, no static private keys on client side are necessary. Usages of encryption include the following code pieces.

../Sources/IDP/Models/SignedChallenge.swift:36

Signature via ecdh ephemeral-static

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_1#2] Signature via ecdh ephemeral-static
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_4#5] one time usage for JWE ECDH-ES Encryption
let algorithm = JWE.Algorithm.ecdh_es(JWE.Algorithm.KeyExchangeContext.bpp256r1(

../Sources/IDP/Models/SignedAuthenticationData.swift:27

Signature via ecdh ephemeral-static

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_1#3] Signature via ecdh ephemeral-static
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_4#4] one time usage for JWE ECDH-ES Encryption
let algorithm = JWE.Algorithm.ecdh_es(JWE.Algorithm.KeyExchangeContext.bpp256r1(

../Sources/IDP/Models/RegistrationData.swift:108

Signature via ecdh ephemeral-static

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_1#4] Signature via ecdh ephemeral-static
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_4#3] one time usage for JWE ECDH-ES Encryption
let algorithm = JWE.Algorithm.ecdh_es(JWE.Algorithm.KeyExchangeContext.bpp256r1(

../Sources/IDP/internal/JWT/JWE+Encryption.swift:20

Signature via ecdh ephemeral-static

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_1#5] Signature via ecdh ephemeral-static
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_4#6] one time usage for JWE ECDH-ES Encryption
let algorithm = JWE.Algorithm.ecdh_es(JWE.Algorithm.KeyExchangeContext.bpp256r1(

../Sources/IDP/internal/TokenPayload.swift:180

Signature via ecdh ephemeral-static

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_1#6] Signature via ecdh ephemeral-static
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_4#2] one time usage for JWE ECDH-ES Encryption
guard let jweHeader = try? JWE.Header(algorithm: JWE.Algorithm.ecdh_es(keyExchangeContext),

O.Cryp_2

Original Requirement

Implementation

All cryptographic requirements are defined within gemSpec_Krypt. The document was created together with BSI.

O.Cryp_3

Original Requirement

Implementation

All cryptographic requirements are defined within gemSpec_Krypt. The document was created together with BSI.

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:62

Secure Enclave Key generation

// Keychain Query
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_3#2,O.Cryp_6#2] Secure Enclave Key generation
let query: [String: Any] = [kSecClass as String: kSecClassKey,

../Sources/IDP/internal/IDPCrypto.swift:45

Brainpool key generator

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19179#2] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_3#3] Brainpool key generator
try BrainpoolP256r1.KeyExchange.generateKey()

../Sources/IDP/internal/JWT/JWE+KDF.swift:35

Brainpool key generator

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_3#4] Brainpool key generator
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19179#4] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL
= { try BrainpoolP256r1.KeyExchange.generateKey() })

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:101

Brainpool key generator

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4367] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_3#5] Brainpool key generator
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19179#5] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
let keyPairGenerator = { try BrainpoolP256r1.KeyExchange.generateKey() }

O.Cryp_4

Original Requirement

Implementation

All cryptographic requirements are defined within gemSpec_Krypt. The document was created together with BSI.

../Sources/IDP/internal/TokenPayload.swift:181

one time usage for JWE ECDH-ES Encryption

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_1#6] Signature via ecdh ephemeral-static
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_4#2] one time usage for JWE ECDH-ES Encryption
guard let jweHeader = try? JWE.Header(algorithm: JWE.Algorithm.ecdh_es(keyExchangeContext),

../Sources/IDP/Models/RegistrationData.swift:109

one time usage for JWE ECDH-ES Encryption

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_1#4] Signature via ecdh ephemeral-static
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_4#3] one time usage for JWE ECDH-ES Encryption
let algorithm = JWE.Algorithm.ecdh_es(JWE.Algorithm.KeyExchangeContext.bpp256r1(

../Sources/IDP/Models/SignedAuthenticationData.swift:28

one time usage for JWE ECDH-ES Encryption

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_1#3] Signature via ecdh ephemeral-static
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_4#4] one time usage for JWE ECDH-ES Encryption
let algorithm = JWE.Algorithm.ecdh_es(JWE.Algorithm.KeyExchangeContext.bpp256r1(

../Sources/IDP/Models/SignedChallenge.swift:37

one time usage for JWE ECDH-ES Encryption

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_1#2] Signature via ecdh ephemeral-static
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_4#5] one time usage for JWE ECDH-ES Encryption
let algorithm = JWE.Algorithm.ecdh_es(JWE.Algorithm.KeyExchangeContext.bpp256r1(

../Sources/IDP/internal/JWT/JWE+Encryption.swift:21

one time usage for JWE ECDH-ES Encryption

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_1#5] Signature via ecdh ephemeral-static
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_4#6] one time usage for JWE ECDH-ES Encryption
let algorithm = JWE.Algorithm.ecdh_es(JWE.Algorithm.KeyExchangeContext.bpp256r1(

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:588

Signature creation with eGK with dedicated C.CH.AUT

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_4#7|12] Signature creation with eGK with dedicated C.CH.AUT
func sign(message: Data) -> AnyPublisher<Data, Swift.Error> {
    // [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20700-07] perform signature with OpenHealthCardKit
    card.sign(data: message)
        .tryMap { response in
            if response.responseStatus == ResponseStatus.success, let signature = response.data {
                return signature
            } else {
                throw NFCSignatureProviderError.signingFailure(.responseStatus(response.responseStatus))
            }
        }
        .eraseToAnyPublisher()
}

O.Cryp_5

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use Brainpool256R1 and ECSECPrimeRandom 256, see usages in O.Cryp_1 to O.Cryp_4

O.Cryp_6

Original Requirement

Implementation

Persisted cryptographic keys are created within the devices secure enclave. Temporal keys are discarded as soon as usage is no longer needed.

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:62

Secure Enclave Key generation

// Keychain Query
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_3#2,O.Cryp_6#2] Secure Enclave Key generation
let query: [String: Any] = [kSecClass as String: kSecClassKey,

O.Cryp_7

Original Requirement

Implementation

As Brainpool256R1 is not available within secure enclave but enforced by BSI where possible, we use secure enclave encryption only for biometric authentication. Everywhere else, cryptographic operations are ephemeral or use the eGK as a secure execution environment.

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:20

Container for private key operations using secure enclave private keys

/// Represents a (SecureEnclave) private key, namely `PrK_SE_AUT`, secured by iOS Biometrics.
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21590] This is the container to represent biometric keys. Usage is limited to
/// authorization purposes
/// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_7#2] Container for private key operations using secure enclave private keys
public struct PrivateKeyContainer {

O.Data_1

Original Requirement

Implementation

User preferences are asked without discrimination within the onboarding process. Application permissions are asked, whenever they are needed, e.g. location permission is only asked when the user is about to search for a pharmacy (see O.Plat_2). If a user chooses to not give the permission, features are still available, if possible.

O.Data_2

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use the OS Keychain to persist sensitive data. The keychain either stores or encrypts via SecureEnclave. Encrypting the database has disadvanteges that we discussed and decided to not yet implement additional database encryption. We are periodically evaluating solutions for this requirement.

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:22

Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19186]
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19188] Deletion of data saved here is managed by the OS.
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21322] Storage implementation uses iOS Keychain
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21595] Storage Implementation
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_8#1,O.Arch_4#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_7#2,O.Data_2#2,O.Auth_13#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
class KeychainStorage: SecureUserDataStore, IDPStorage, SecureEGKCertificateStorage {

O.Data_3

Original Requirement

Implementation

Currently it is not possible to store data within the secure enclave on iOS. We store all data on the encrypted application container on the device. See eRpApp.entitlements for NSFileProtectionCompleteUnlessOpen usage.

O.Data_4

Original Requirement

Implementation

Everything we store, safe or send anywhere is both verified as in O.Resi_6 and or encrypted, such as Keychain or the application container.

O.Data_5

Original Requirement

Implementation

Ephemeral private keys are released as soon as they are no longer needed (see O.Source_5).

O.Data_6

Original Requirement

Implementation

Collected data is sparse and use case related as required.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/CAN/CardWallCANView.swift:121

CAN is used for eGK connection

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_2#2,O.Data_6#2] CAN is used for eGK connection
CardWallCANInputView(

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CameraView/ErxTaskScannerView.swift:22

Scanning tasks contains purpose related data input

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_2#1,O.Data_6#3] Scanning tasks contains purpose related data input
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_1#1] Scanning tasks starts with scanner callback
store.send(.analyse(scanOutput: $0))

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/PIN/CardWallPINView.swift:17

PIN is used for eGK Connection

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_2#3,O.Data_6#4] PIN is used for eGK Connection
PINView(store: store).padding()

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Pharmacy/Redeem/PharmacyContactView.swift:11

Contact information is collected when needed for redeeming

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_2#6,O.Data_6#5] Contact information is collected when needed for redeeming
struct PharmacyContactView: View {

../Sources/eRpApp/Tracking/AnalyticsReducer.swift:16

User interaction analytics trigger …

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_2#4,O.Purp_4#1,O.Data_6#6] User interaction analytics trigger ...
struct AnalyticsReducer<ContentReducer: Reducer>: Reducer

../Sources/eRpApp/Tracking/ContentSquareAnalyticsAdapter.swift:101

… records data only if user opt-in is given.

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_2#5,O.Purp_4#2,O.Data_6#7] ... records data only if user opt-in is given.
if optIn {

O.Data_7

Original Requirement

Implementation

Private data is not initially created by the application. Only additional information, such as redeeming or deleting prescriptions create data. The created data is kept on the FD.

O.Data_8

Original Requirement

Implementation

The device camera is used optional for scanning prescriptions and for setting a profile avatar. Avatar image data never leaves the device.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CameraView/AVScannerView.swift:40

This controller uses the camera as an input device. Frames are processed but never

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Data_8#2] This controller uses the camera as an input device. Frames are processed but never
// stored, metadata is never created here.
class AVScannerViewController: UIViewController, AVCaptureMetadataOutputObjectsDelegate {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/Profile/ImagePicker/PhotoPicker.swift:47

Meta data is completely removed by converting to jpeg

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Data_8#3,O.Data_9#2] Meta data is completely removed by converting to jpeg
guard let data = tempImage.jpegData(compressionQuality: 0.3) else {

O.Data_9

Original Requirement

Implementation

The device camera is used for scanning prescriptions and for setting a profile avatar. Neither use-cases export data to the device photo library or export in any other way.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/Profile/ImagePicker/PhotoPicker.swift:47

Meta data is completely removed by converting to jpeg

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Data_8#3,O.Data_9#2] Meta data is completely removed by converting to jpeg
guard let data = tempImage.jpegData(compressionQuality: 0.3) else {

O.Data_10

Original Requirement

Implementation

Password fields are marked as such and thus disallow autocorrections. Search for SecureField or SecureFieldWithReveal for all usages.

../App/Sources/AppDelegate.swift:35

Keyboard extensions are disallowed

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Data_10#2|10] Keyboard extensions are disallowed
func application(
    _: UIApplication,
    shouldAllowExtensionPointIdentifier extensionPointIdentifier: UIApplication.ExtensionPointIdentifier
) -> Bool {
    // Disallow 3rd party keyboards to prevent leaking sensitive data
    if extensionPointIdentifier == .keyboard {
        return false
    }
    return true
}

../Sources/eRpApp/Components/Controls/SecureFieldWithReveal.swift:36

SecureFields are used for password input.

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Data_10#3] `SecureFields` are used for password input.
SecureField(text: $text) {

O.Data_11

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use default platform behavior for password fields. Pasting into password fields is allowed, copying is denied. In general the clipboard is only filled with any data, if the user triggers it.

O.Data_12

Original Requirement

Implementation

There is no API from Apple that allows extraction of biometric or private key data from the secure enclave. Non ephemeral keys are only created within the secure enclave.

O.Data_13

Original Requirement

Implementation

Suppressing Screenshots is not possible as of now.

../Sources/eRpApp/SceneDelegate.swift:246

Moving the application to the background blurs the application

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Data_13#2,O.Plat_9#2] Moving the application to the background blurs the application
// window.
addBlurOverlayToWindow()

../Sources/eRpApp/SceneDelegate.swift:165

Moving the application to the foreground removes the blur.

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Data_13#3,O.Plat_9#3] Moving the application to the foreground removes the blur.
removeBlurOverlayFromWindow()

O.Data_14

Original Requirement

Implementation

See eRpApp.entitlements for NSFileProtectionCompleteUnlessOpen usage.

O.Data_15

Original Requirement

Implementation

Biometric keys are always bound to the device and cannot leave the secure enclave. Actual user data is excluded from backups and cannot be exported.

../Sources/eRpLocalStorage/CoreDataController.swift:83

Database backup exclusion

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_8#4,O.Arch_4#2,O.Data_15#1] Database backup exclusion
if excludeFromBackup, let storeUrl = store.url {

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:126

prevents migration to other devices

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21586] prevents migration to other devices
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Data_15#2] prevents migration to other devices
kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly,

O.Data_16

Original Requirement

Implementation

Deletion is completely handled by the OS. We have no means of doing anything while deinstallation is running. All sensitive keychain data is tied to the user profile id and cannot be accessed after deinstallation. though technically the information still persists for a short period of time (<24h) after some kind of daily cleanup routine by the OS it will be removed. The user may choose to manually logout or delete profiles before app deletion.

O.Data_17

Original Requirement

Implementation

Deletion is completely handled by the OS. We have no means of doing anything while deinstallation is running. All sensitive keychain data is tied to the user profile id and cannot be accessed after deinstallation. though technically the information still persists for a short period of time (<24h) after some kind of daily cleanup routine by the OS it will be removed. The user may choose to manually logout or delete profiles before app deletion.

O.Data_18

Original Requirement

Implementation

Not applicable: no kill switch realized.

O.Ntwk_1

Original Requirement

Implementation

No exceptions set in NSAppTransportSecurity, HTTP via TLS is enforced (see also: Requirements for Connecting Using ATS); Certificate transparency ensures authenticity of the server side. User access tokens ensures client side authenticity.

O.Ntwk_2

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use one wrapper around NSURLSession for network communication that uses an ephemeral configuration only allowing TLS 1.2 or greater. Network communication security in general is specified within gemSpec_Krypt and aggreed upon with BSI.

../Sources/HTTPClient/DefaultHTTPClient.swift:36

URLSession is used as Network Framework

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4385,A_18467,A_18464,GS-A_4387]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20606#2] Setup of minimum TLS Version to use.
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20206]
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Ntwk_2#2,O.Ntwk_3#2,O.Ntwk_7#2] URLSession is used as Network Framework
urlSessionConfiguration.tlsMinimumSupportedProtocolVersion = .TLSv12

O.Ntwk_3

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use the system provided NSURLSession for network communication and no additional layer for TLS encryption. The iOS encryption is certified according to https://support.apple.com/de-de/guide/certifications/apc3fa917cb49/web

../Sources/HTTPClient/DefaultHTTPClient.swift:36

URLSession is used as Network Framework

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4385,A_18467,A_18464,GS-A_4387]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20606#2] Setup of minimum TLS Version to use.
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20206]
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Ntwk_2#2,O.Ntwk_3#2,O.Ntwk_7#2] URLSession is used as Network Framework
urlSessionConfiguration.tlsMinimumSupportedProtocolVersion = .TLSv12

O.Ntwk_4

Original Requirement

Implementation

We do not pin TLS Certificates, instead we pin TI PKI Certificates for FD and IDP communication. Since we got an agreement with the BSI regarding the usage of pinning, (TI PKI Pinning is enough) we remove the TLS pinning itself, in favor of certificate transparency + our second layer of TI Certificate pinning. If accessing the APOVZD, we don’t have such pinning. However, the need for pinning is due to high protection demand of the medical data. But the APOVZD does not hold such data, thus we interpret that pinning is not necessary there at all. Furthermore, we don’t see attack vectors regarding the APOVZD. It only required an API Key, but no authentication. Redeeming prescriptions directly with pharmacies, we encrypt the payload with an encryption certificate, that again is checked to be within TI PKI.

../Sources/eRpApp/AppConfiguration.swift:118

Gematik Root CA 3 as a trust anchor has to be set in the program code

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218] Gematik Root CA 3 as a trust anchor has to be set in the program code
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Ntwk_4#2|16] Gematik Root CA 3 as a trust anchor has to be set in the program code
// swiftlint:disable:next force_try
let TRUSTANCHOR_GemRootCa3 = try! TrustAnchor(withPEM: """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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
""")

O.Ntwk_5

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use NSURLSession as the base for all our network requests. NSURLSession uses ATS (App Transport Security) that enforces rules for TLS Certificates, such as authenticity. See https://support.apple.com/en-us/103214 and https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/information_property_list/nsrequirescertificatetransparency# for additional information.

O.Ntwk_6

Original Requirement

Implementation

The server uses extended validation certificates to ensure maximum authenticity. On top of TLS we also implement message authenticity by validating checksums and signatures. For IDP Communication see O.Resi_6, for FD communication see the following code.

../Sources/VAUClient/VAUInterceptor.swift:14

Interceptor implementing request and response encryption.

/// The VAU (trusted execution environment) http Interceptor to encrypt HTTP-Requests before sending them
/// and decrypting the received encrypted responses.
/// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Ntwk_6#2] Interceptor implementing request and response encryption.
class VAUInterceptor: Interceptor {

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:111

Decrypting and verifying FD server messages

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Ntwk_6#3|21] Decrypting and verifying FD server messages
func decrypt(data: Data) throws -> String {
    // Steps according to gemSpec_Krypt A_20174
    // [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20174#13] 3: Decrypt using AES symmetric key
    guard let sealed = try? AES.GCM.SealedBox(combined: data),
          let decrypted = try? AES.GCM.open(sealed, using: symmetricKey),
          let utf8 = decrypted.utf8string
    else {
        throw VAUError.responseValidation
    }

    // [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20174#14] 4+5: Verify decrypted message. Expect: "1 <request id> <response header+body>"
    let separated = utf8.split(separator: " ", maxSplits: 2).map { String($0) }
    guard separated.count == 3,
          separated[0] == "1",
          separated[1] == requestId
    else {
        throw VAUError.responseValidation
    }

    return separated[2]
}

O.Ntwk_7

Original Requirement

Implementation

The system enforces ATS App Transport Security since the app uses the standard URL Loading System URLSession which automatically negotiate the most secure connection available from the server. Also there are no exceptions configured in the eRpApp/Resources/Info.plist thus insecure networt connections are disabled by default.

../Sources/HTTPClient/DefaultHTTPClient.swift:36

URLSession is used as Network Framework

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4385,A_18467,A_18464,GS-A_4387]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20606#2] Setup of minimum TLS Version to use.
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20206]
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Ntwk_2#2,O.Ntwk_3#2,O.Ntwk_7#2] URLSession is used as Network Framework
urlSessionConfiguration.tlsMinimumSupportedProtocolVersion = .TLSv12

O.Ntwk_8

Original Requirement

Implementation

Logging does not take place in the FdV for reasons of data minimization. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear who this log would be for. We have separate responsibilities divided between two different operators of the IDP and the specialized service, and gematik as the manufacturer of the e-prescription app. None of the backend systems have such a required endpoint. Moreover, the aforementioned questions would still arise.

O.Paid_1

Original Requirement

Implementation

The app does not offer any purchases. The only paid service, that is used by the app in some extent can be mobile data. The terms of use in the app states, that costs might occur using mobile data.

O.Paid_2

Original Requirement

Implementation

The app does not offer any purchases.

O.Paid_3

Original Requirement

Implementation

The app does not offer any purchases.

O.Paid_4

Original Requirement

Implementation

The app does not offer any purchases.

O.Paid_5

Original Requirement

Implementation

The app does not offer any purchases.

O.Paid_6

Original Requirement

Implementation

The app does not offer any purchases.

O.Paid_7

Original Requirement

Implementation

The app does not offer any purchases.

O.Paid_8

Original Requirement

Implementation

The app does not offer any purchases.

O.Paid_9

Original Requirement

Implementation

The app does not offer any purchases.

O.Paid_10

Original Requirement

Implementation

The app does not offer any purchases.

O.Pass_1

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use zxcvbn-ios as a password strength indicator and enforcer for the application password.

../Sources/eRpApp/Helper/PasswordStrengthTester.swift:37

We use an additional german word list to check against common passwords

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Pass_1#2,O.Pass_2#2] We use an additional german word list to check against common passwords
private(set) lazy var wordList: [String] = {

O.Pass_2

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use zxcvbn-ios as a password strength indicator and enforcer for the application password.

../Sources/eRpApp/Helper/PasswordStrengthTester.swift:37

We use an additional german word list to check against common passwords

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Pass_1#2,O.Pass_2#2] We use an additional german word list to check against common passwords
private(set) lazy var wordList: [String] = {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingRegisterAuthenticationView.swift:235

Password strength view within onboarding.

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Pass_2#2] Password strength view within onboarding.
PasswordStrengthView(strength: store.passwordStrength,

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/RegisterAuthenticationDomain.swift:175

Testing the acutal password strength

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Pass_2#3] Testing the acutal password strength
state.passwordStrength = passwordStrengthTester.passwordStrength(for: state.passwordA)

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/AppSecurity/CreatePasswordView.swift:80

Password strength view within settings.

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Pass_2#4] Password strength view within settings.
PasswordStrengthView(strength: store.passwordStrength)

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/AppSecurity/CreatePasswordDomain.swift:91

Testing the actual password strength while updating within settings

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Pass_2#5] Testing the actual password strength while updating within settings
state.passwordStrength = passwordStrengthTester.passwordStrength(for: state.passwordA)

O.Pass_3

Original Requirement

Implementation

The user may change the app passwords within the settings.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/AppSecurity/CreatePasswordView.swift:10

View for changing the user password

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Pass_3#2] View for changing the user password
struct CreatePasswordView: View {

O.Pass_4

Original Requirement

Implementation

The application password is not used for the baackend. There is no protocol for the application password within the application, although we implement a counter for failed password attempts.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/AppAuthentication/AppAuthenticationView.swift:25

Display of failed login attempts counter

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Pass_4#2] Display of failed login attempts counter
if store.failedAuthenticationsCount != 0 {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/AppAuthentication/AppAuthenticationDomain.swift:109

Increase failed attempts count on failed verification

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Pass_4#3] Increase failed attempts count on failed verification
state.failedAuthenticationsCount += 1

O.Pass_5

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use the keychain to persist the hashed app password and the corresponding salt. The salt is regenerated, whenever a new password is stored.

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/Helper/AppSecurityManager.swift:45

The salt is regenerated, whenever a new password is stored.

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Pass_5#2|4] The salt is regenerated, whenever a new password is stored.
guard let data = password.data(using: .utf8),
      let salt = try? randomGenerator(32) else {
    throw AppSecurityManagerError.savePasswordFailed
}

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/Helper/AppSecurityManager.swift:51

Password is stored alongside hash within keychain.

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Pass_5#3|8] Password is stored alongside hash within keychain.
do {
    let hashedPassword = hash(data + salt)
    guard try keychainAccess.setGenericPassword(salt, for: Self.passwordSaltIdentifier),
          try keychainAccess.setGenericPassword(hashedPassword, for: Self.passwordHashIdentifier) else {
        throw AppSecurityManagerError.savePasswordFailed
    }
    return true
} catch {

O.Plat_1

Original Requirement

Implementation

We test for device pincode at startup and show a dialog if no pin is set.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/MainView.swift:95

trigger device security check

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_6#2,O.Resi_2#2,O.Plat_1#2] trigger device security check
store.send(.loadDeviceSecurityView)

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/Helper/DeviceSecurityManager.swift:58

calculate system risk for jailbreak and missing device pin

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_6#3,O.Resi_2#3,O.Plat_1#3] calculate system risk for jailbreak and missing device pin
var showSystemSecurityWarning: AnyPublisher<DeviceSecurityWarningType, Never> {

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/Helper/DeviceSecurityManager.swift:68

Missing system pin detection

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Plat_1#4] Missing system pin detection
var informMissingSystemPin: AnyPublisher<Bool, Never> {

O.Plat_2

Original Requirement

Implementation

The app ony configures entitlements that are used for it’s primary purpose. All configured entitlements are configured in eRpApp/Resources/Info.plist and in eRpApp/Resources/eRpApp.entitlements.

O.Plat_3

Original Requirement

Implementation

The platform enforces dialogs whenever accessing private data or sensors and user permission is not already given. Localizations can be found within InfoPlist.strings

O.Plat_4

Original Requirement

Implementation

We never show sensitive data as all errors are localized with custom descriptions (See LocalizedError implementations). Some errors have localized parameters such as a failed PIN counter. Some errors are sent from the server, these messages show only generic information what went wrong. See O.Source_3 for reference.

O.Plat_5

Original Requirement

Implementation

Not applicable: displaying of messages not realized.

O.Plat_6

Original Requirement

Implementation

Implemented by the OS Sandboxing.

O.Plat_7

Original Requirement

Implementation

The only method we use for inter process communication is universal linking. Current outgoing use-cases are limited to login with insurance company apps. No sensitive data is transferred, the actual payload is decided by the server, as the universal links are created server side.

O.Plat_8

Original Requirement

Implementation

We only use native code and do not rely on any rendering engine, besides rendering some static HTML Pages (e.g. OSS-Licenses, Data Privacy, Terms of Use) that do not contain any scripts.

O.Plat_9

Original Requirement

Implementation

The content window is blurred upon leaving the application to not expose content to the system multitasking switcher.

../Sources/eRpApp/SceneDelegate.swift:246

Moving the application to the background blurs the application

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Data_13#2,O.Plat_9#2] Moving the application to the background blurs the application
// window.
addBlurOverlayToWindow()

../Sources/eRpApp/SceneDelegate.swift:165

Moving the application to the foreground removes the blur.

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Data_13#3,O.Plat_9#3] Moving the application to the foreground removes the blur.
removeBlurOverlayFromWindow()

O.Plat_10

Original Requirement

Implementation

Implemented using a WKWebViewDelegate.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ExtAuth/CardWallExtAuthConfirmationDomain.swift:91

Start login via gID

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22294-01] Start login via gID
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_4#9,O.Plat_10#2] Start login via gID
return .publisher(

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/DataPrivacyTermsOfUseNavigationDelegate.swift:9

Delegate disables unused schemes

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Plat_10#2] Delegate disables unused schemes
class DataPrivacyTermsOfUseNavigationDelegate: NSObject, WKNavigationDelegate {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/DataPrivacy/DataPrivacyView.swift:23

Usage of the delegate

// swiftlint:disable:next weak_delegate
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Plat_10#3] Usage of the delegate
let navigationDelegate = DataPrivacyTermsOfUseNavigationDelegate()

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ExtAuth/CardWallExtAuthConfirmationDomain.swift:106

Follow redirect

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22299-01] Follow redirect
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Plat_10#3] Follow redirect
guard environment.resourceHandler.canOpenURL(url) else {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/Introduction/CardWallIntroductionDomain.swift:191

Follow redirect

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Sek:A_22299] Follow redirect
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Plat_10#3] Follow redirect
guard resourceHandler.canOpenURL(url) else {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/FOSS/FOSSView.swift:21

Usage of the delegate

// swiftlint:disable:next weak_delegate
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Plat_10#4] Usage of the delegate
let navigationDelegate = DataPrivacyTermsOfUseNavigationDelegate()

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/TermsOfUse/TermsOfUseView.swift:22

Usage of the delegate

// swiftlint:disable:next weak_delegate
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Plat_10#5] Usage of the delegate
let navigationDelegate = DataPrivacyTermsOfUseNavigationDelegate()

O.Plat_11

Original Requirement

Implementation

WebViews only display local content that is delivered together with the application. Javascript is disabled, linking and loading other content is disabled. All other links to websites open the system browser. No cookies are created within the application or any webview that the application hosts.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/DataPrivacy/DataPrivacyView.swift:27

disabled javascript

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Plat_11#2] disabled javascript
wkWebView.configuration.defaultWebpagePreferences.allowsContentJavaScript = false

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/TermsOfUse/TermsOfUseView.swift:26

disabled javascript

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Plat_11#3] disabled javascript
wkWebView.configuration.defaultWebpagePreferences.allowsContentJavaScript = false

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/FOSS/FOSSView.swift:25

disabled javascript

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Plat_11#4] disabled javascript
wkWebView.configuration.defaultWebpagePreferences.allowsContentJavaScript = false

O.Plat_12

Original Requirement

Implementation

The app’s memory is subject to the operating system’s memory and therefore it has no control over the used memory. There is no technique known to overwrite memory in swift in a safe way, so that value types are deleted safely. The platform promises safety at process boundaries.

O.Plat_13

Original Requirement

Implementation

During the onboarding process the user is forced to secure the access to the app either via a biometric trait or a strong password (or both). There is no additional security setting the user cannot set within the onbording.

O.Plat_14

Original Requirement

Implementation

We do not log within the application. Though, logging is in place on FD and IDP and user data related events are logged into the audit events, that can be displayed within the application.

O.Purp_1

Original Requirement

Implementation

The purpose is displayed as part of the Onboarding and can later be viewed from the settings.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingLegalInfoView.swift:159

Display as part of the onboarding

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_1#1] Display as part of the onboarding
struct OnboardingPrivacyView: View {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/DataPrivacy/DataPrivacyView.swift:12

Actual View driving the display of DataPrivacy.html

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_1#2] Actual View driving the display of `DataPrivacy.html`
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_8#3] Webview containing local html without javascript
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19980#2] Actual View driving the display of `DataPrivacy.html`
struct DataPrivacyView: View {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsLegalInfoView.swift:28

DataPrivacy display within Settings

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_9#3,O.Purp_1#4] DataPrivacy display within Settings
NavigationLink(

O.Purp_2

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CameraView/ErxTaskScannerView.swift:22

Scanning tasks contains purpose related data input

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_2#1,O.Data_6#3] Scanning tasks contains purpose related data input
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_1#1] Scanning tasks starts with scanner callback
store.send(.analyse(scanOutput: $0))

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/CAN/CardWallCANView.swift:121

CAN is used for eGK connection

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_2#2,O.Data_6#2] CAN is used for eGK connection
CardWallCANInputView(

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/PIN/CardWallPINView.swift:17

PIN is used for eGK Connection

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_2#3,O.Data_6#4] PIN is used for eGK Connection
PINView(store: store).padding()

../Sources/eRpApp/Tracking/AnalyticsReducer.swift:16

User interaction analytics trigger …

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_2#4,O.Purp_4#1,O.Data_6#6] User interaction analytics trigger ...
struct AnalyticsReducer<ContentReducer: Reducer>: Reducer

../Sources/eRpApp/Tracking/ContentSquareAnalyticsAdapter.swift:101

… records data only if user opt-in is given.

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_2#5,O.Purp_4#2,O.Data_6#7] ... records data only if user opt-in is given.
if optIn {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Pharmacy/Redeem/PharmacyContactView.swift:11

Contact information is collected when needed for redeeming

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_2#6,O.Data_6#5] Contact information is collected when needed for redeeming
struct PharmacyContactView: View {

O.Purp_3

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingContainer.swift:59

Terms of Use display is part of the onboarding

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_3#1] Terms of Use display is part of the onboarding
.sheet(isPresented: $store.showTermsOfUse.sending(\.setShowUse)) {

Terms of Use acceptance is required as part of the Onboarding.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/TermsOfUse/TermsOfUseView.swift:11

Actual view for the Terms of Use display

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_3#2] Actual view for the Terms of Use display
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_8#1] Webview containing local html without javascript
struct TermsOfUseView: View {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingLegalInfoView.swift:72

User acceptance

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_3#3] User acceptance
OnboardingLegalInfoCheckmarkView(isAccepted: $isAllAccepted)

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingContainer.swift:39

Callback triggers tracking alert

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_3#4] Callback triggers tracking alert
store.send(.showTracking)

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingDomain.swift:191

Show comply route to display analytics usage within onboarding

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19088,A_19091-01#1,A_19092-01#2] Show comply route to display analytics usage within
// onboarding
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_3#5] Show comply route to display analytics usage within onboarding
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19089-01#2] Show comply route to display analytics usage within onboarding
case .showTracking:

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingDomain.swift:195

Accept usage analytics

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19090-01,A_19091-01#2] User confirms the opt in within settings
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_3#6] Accept usage analytics
case .alert(.presented(.allowTracking)):

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingDomain.swift:200

Deny usage analytics

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19092-01#3] User may choose to not accept analytics, onboarding will still continue
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_3#7] Deny usage analytics
case .alert(.dismiss):

O.Purp_4

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Tracking/AnalyticsReducer.swift:16

User interaction analytics trigger …

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_2#4,O.Purp_4#1,O.Data_6#6] User interaction analytics trigger ...
struct AnalyticsReducer<ContentReducer: Reducer>: Reducer

../Sources/eRpApp/Tracking/ContentSquareAnalyticsAdapter.swift:101

… records data only if user opt-in is given.

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_2#5,O.Purp_4#2,O.Data_6#7] ... records data only if user opt-in is given.
if optIn {

O.Purp_5

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsView.swift:159

Toggle within Settings to enable and disable usage analytics

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19097-01#2] Toggle within Settings to enable and disable usage analytics
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_5#1] Toggle within Settings to enable and disable usage analytics
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_6#1] Current Analytics state is inspectable by the user
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19982#4] Opt out of analytics
Toggle(isOn: $store.trackerOptIn.sending(\.toggleTrackingTapped).animation()) {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsDomain.swift:156

Actual disabling of analytics

// Tracking
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19088, A_19089-01#5, A_19092-01#4, A_19097-01#1] React to later opt-in or deactivation
// of usage analytics
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_5#2] Actual disabling of analytics
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19982#2] Opt out of analytics
case let .toggleTrackingTapped(optIn):

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsView.swift:46

Show comply view for settings triggered analytics enabling

// Tracking comply sheet presentation
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_5#3] Show comply view for settings triggered analytics enabling
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19982#3,A_19089-01#3] Show information dialog for analytics usage
Rectangle()

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsDomain.swift:166

User confirms the opt in within settings

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19090-01,A_19091-01#4] User confirms the opt in within settings
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_5#4] User confirms the opt in within settings
case .confirmedOptInTracking:

O.Purp_6

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsView.swift:160

Current Analytics state is inspectable by the user

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19097-01#2] Toggle within Settings to enable and disable usage analytics
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_5#1] Toggle within Settings to enable and disable usage analytics
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_6#1] Current Analytics state is inspectable by the user
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19982#4] Opt out of analytics
Toggle(isOn: $store.trackerOptIn.sending(\.toggleTrackingTapped).animation()) {

As most of the user decisions are client side no history is available. Only the current state can be inspected.

O.Purp_7

Original Requirement

Implementation

Most libraries are self written and cover only what is needed. Dependencies are only included if really necessary. We think about including only sub packages, but as most dependencies are very small, this is hardly used. Besides that, no means of removing unused dependency functionality is available for libraries of the platform.

O.Purp_8

Original Requirement

Implementation

Sharing of data is only for the primary purpose of the application e.g. sending presriptions to a pharmacy or sharing a prescription with a family member. We do not store data in shared containers in any way.

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:21

Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19186]
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19188] Deletion of data saved here is managed by the OS.
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21322] Storage implementation uses iOS Keychain
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21595] Storage Implementation
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_8#1,O.Arch_4#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_7#2,O.Data_2#2,O.Auth_13#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
class KeychainStorage: SecureUserDataStore, IDPStorage, SecureEGKCertificateStorage {

../Sources/eRpLocalStorage/CoreDataControllerFactory.swift:32

CoreData databases are protected

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_8#2] CoreData databases are protected
self.fileProtection = fileProtection

../Sources/eRpLocalStorage/CoreDataController.swift:59

actual protection setting on file system level

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_8#3|4] actual protection setting on file system level
protectedStoreDescription.setOption(
    fileProtectionType as NSObject,
    forKey: NSPersistentStoreFileProtectionKey
)

../Sources/eRpLocalStorage/CoreDataController.swift:83

Database backup exclusion

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_8#4,O.Arch_4#2,O.Data_15#1] Database backup exclusion
if excludeFromBackup, let storeUrl = store.url {

O.Purp_9

Original Requirement

Implementation

Sensitive data is only shown for the purpose of this application. This includes display of prescriptions, personal data and health data.

O.Rand_1

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use the platform provided secure random generator. iOS is FIPS 140-2 certified. The operating system uses an entropy pool with different sources, including a true random number generator from the secure enclave, that is present on every device. Security certifcates can be found https://support.apple.com/de-li/guide/certifications/apc3fa917cb49/web, including FIPS 140-2 und Common Criteria.

../Sources/IDP/internal/SecKeyRandom.swift:21

Secure Random generator.

/// Generate random Data with given length
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4367]
/// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Rand_1#2] Secure Random generator.
///
/// - Parameters:
///   - length: the number of bytes to generate
///   - randomizer: the randomizer to be used. Default: kSecRandomDefault
/// - Returns: the random initialized Data
/// - Throws: `IDPError`
public func generateSecureRandom(length: Int, randomizer: SecRandomRef? = kSecRandomDefault) throws -> Data {

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAURandom.swift:22

Secure Random generator.

/// Generate random Data with given length
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4367]
/// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Rand_1#3] Secure Random generator.
///
/// - Parameters:
///   - length: the number of bytes to generate
///   - randomizer: the randomizer to be used. Default: kSecRandomDefault
/// - Returns: the random initialized Data
/// - Throws: `VAUError`
static func generateSecureRandom(length: Int, randomizer: SecRandomRef? = kSecRandomDefault) throws -> Data {

O.Resi_1

Original Requirement

Implementation

The onboarding contains defaults that are best practices, such as using biometrics for authentication. While using the Cardwall, selecting the “save login” option results in an dialog with additional information, to let the user make informed decisions. A missing device passcode results in a dialog that is recommending the setup of a device passcode.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingRegisterAuthenticationView.swift:11

View containing onboarding authentication

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Resi_1#2] View containing onboarding authentication
struct OnboardingRegisterAuthenticationView: View, KeyboardReadable {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/Login/CardWallLoginOptionView.swift:95

View containing information regarding the login options.

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21574] Actual view
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Resi_1#3] View containing information regarding the login options.
struct PrivacyWarningViewContainer: View {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/DeviceSecurity/DeviceSecurityNoSystemPin/DeviceSecuritySystemPinView.swift:9

View containing the “no system pin” message.

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Resi_1#4] View containing the "no system pin" message.
struct DeviceSecuritySystemPinView: View {

O.Resi_2

Original Requirement

Implementation

Jailbreak detection is done on startup of the application after the app authentication. If a jailbreak is detected, a information dialog is presented to the user.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/MainView.swift:95

trigger device security check

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_6#2,O.Resi_2#2,O.Plat_1#2] trigger device security check
store.send(.loadDeviceSecurityView)

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/Helper/DeviceSecurityManager.swift:58

calculate system risk for jailbreak and missing device pin

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_6#3,O.Resi_2#3,O.Plat_1#3] calculate system risk for jailbreak and missing device pin
var showSystemSecurityWarning: AnyPublisher<DeviceSecurityWarningType, Never> {

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/Helper/DeviceSecurityManager.swift:112

Jailbreak detection

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_6#4,O.Resi_2#4] Jailbreak detection
func informJailbreakDetected() -> Bool {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/DeviceSecurity/DeviceSecurityRootedDevice/DeviceSecurityRootedDeviceView.swift:9

Jailbreak information view

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_6#5,O.Resi_2#5] Jailbreak information view
struct DeviceSecurityRootedDeviceView: View {

O.Resi_3

Original Requirement

Implementation

Starting within a debug environment is only possible on rooted/jailbroken devices. If that is the case, the user sees a dialog and can choose to continue or cancel using the application. See O.Resi_2 for jailbreak detection details.

O.Resi_4

Original Requirement

Implementation

Starting with unusal app rights is only possible on rooted/jailbroken devices. If that is the case, the user sees a dialog and can choose to continue or cancel using the application. See O.Resi_2 for jailbreak detection details.

O.Resi_5

Original Requirement

Implementation

Device Integrity may only be compromised on jailbroken devices. If that is the case, the user sees a dialog and can choose to continue or cancel using the application. See O.Resi_2 for jailbreak detection details. We exclude very old and unsecure devices, by restricting the application to modern iOS Versions. That restriction is automatically restricting the range of devices it can run on. See options.deploymentTarget.iOS path within project.yml or the generated IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET within the project.pbxproj file for the iOS Version restriction.

O.Resi_6

Original Requirement

Implementation

IDP Communication is secured by using TLS with pinned Certificates as well as JWEs with keys that are pinned using a TI specific trust anchor as well as OCSP. FD Communication is secured by using TLS and VAU encryption, again with pinned Certificates for both methods. APOVZD communication uses TLS with pinned certificates. The Pinned certificates fingerprints can be found within Sources/eRpApp/Resources/Info.plist.

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:262

Implementation of loading the discovery document for fetching signature and

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Resi_6#2] Implementation of loading the discovery document for fetching signature and
// encryption keys.
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21222#3] DiscoveryDocument is validated with the active trustStoreSession
private func loadDiscoveryDocument() -> AnyPublisher<DiscoveryDocument, IDPError> {

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:423

Discovery Document signature verification

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22296-01] Signature verification
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_23082#3] Signature verification
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Resi_6#3] Discovery Document signature verification
guard try jwtContainer.verify(with: document.discKey) == true else {

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:291

Discovery Document signature verification

// Validate JWT/DiscoveryDocument signature
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Only implemented for brainpoolP256r1
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Resi_6#4] Discovery Document signature verification
guard (try? fetchedDocument.backing.verify(with: fetchedDocument.discKey)) ?? false else {

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:757

Discovery Document signature verification

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Resi_6#5|6] Discovery Document signature verification
validate(certificate: discoveryDocument.discKey)
    // [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20625#3|4] `C.FD.SIG`-Certificate verification
    .zip(validate(certificate: discoveryDocument.signingCert))
    .map { isDiscKeyValid, isSigningCertValid -> Bool in
        isDiscKeyValid && isSigningCertValid
    }

O.Resi_7

Original Requirement

Implementation

Recent Jailbreaks force a reboot or restart of springboard. Thus the application will also be restarted in these cases. The check for hardening is done on app startup and should be sufficient.

O.Resi_8

Original Requirement

Implementation

The application source is available on github. Any measure of preventing reverse engineering would be pointless.

O.Resi_9

Original Requirement

Implementation

Data is not stored while moving between platforms or devices. Private keys are stored within the secure enclave an cannot leave the device. Downgrades are prohibited by the operating system and update mechanisms.

O.Resi_10

Original Requirement

Implementation

Missing internet connection or other means of disruption use the same error mechanisms as every part of the app uses for normal errors. Data is only deleted where appropriate, e.g. invalid tokens are deleted. User Data is not deleted unless explicitly confirmed by the user.

O.Source_1

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CameraView/ErxTaskScannerView.swift:23

Scanning tasks starts with scanner callback

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_2#1,O.Data_6#3] Scanning tasks contains purpose related data input
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_1#1] Scanning tasks starts with scanner callback
store.send(.analyse(scanOutput: $0))

We have two potential unknown inputs, one being the scanner, that scanns QR Codes or Data Matrix Codes. External interactions are managed through Universal Linking, with thorough validation of URL parameters to ensure only predefined variables are accepted.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CameraView/ScannerDomain.swift:129

analyse the input

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_1#2] analyse the input
let result = try CodeAnalyser.analyse(scanOutput: scanOutput, with: state.acceptedTaskBatches)

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CameraView/ScannerDomain+Helper.swift:16

validation

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_1#3] validation
static func analyse(scanOutput: [ScanOutput],

../Sources/eRpKit/ScannedErxTask.swift:104

actual validation by decoding into predefined structure

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19984] validate data matrix code structure
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_1#4] actual validation by decoding into predefined structure
erxToken = try jsonDecoder.decode(ErxToken.self, from: jsonData)

../Sources/eRpApp/SceneDelegate.swift:250

External application calls via Universal Linking

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_1#5] External application calls via Universal Linking
func scene(_: UIScene, continue userActivity: NSUserActivity) {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/AppStartDomain.swift:221

External application calls via Universal Linking

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_1#6] External application calls via Universal Linking
case let .universalLink(url):

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/MainDomain.swift:257

redirect into correct domain

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_1#7] redirect into correct domain
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22301-01#6|3] Redirect into ExtAuthPendingDomain
return .run { send in

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/ExtAuth/ExtAuthPendingDomain.swift:156

Validate data by parsing url and only allowing predefined variables as String

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_1#8] Validate data by parsing url and only allowing predefined variables as String
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22301-01#7] Actual handling of the universal link, user feedback via dialogs e.g.
case let .externalLogin(url),

O.Source_2

Original Requirement

Implementation

Data escaping is managed by the operating system frameworks. We do not create SQL queries manually; instead, we utilize CoreData as an ORM. Queries are constructed using NSFetchRequests and NSPredicates, which automatically escape all manual input. Additionally, actual user data is transmitted via FHIR, with the escaping process handled by Apple’s provided FHIR library.

../Sources/eRpLocalStorage/Pharmacy/PharmacyCoreDataStore.swift:13

CoreDataStore adapter for PharmacyLocations

/// Store for fetching, creating, updating or deleting `PharmacyLocation`s on the provided `CoreDataController`
/// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_2#2] CoreDataStore adapter for `PharmacyLocation`s
public class PharmacyCoreDataStore: PharmacyLocalDataStore, CoreDataCrudable {

../Sources/eRpLocalStorage/Prescriptions/ErxTaskCoreDataStore.swift:20

CoreDataStore adapter for ErxTasks

// tag::ErxTaskCoreDataStoreDescription[]
/// Store for fetching, creating, updating or deleting `ErxTask`s and it‘s underlying types. Access to most entities is
/// tied to the given profileId.
/// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_2#3] CoreDataStore adapter for `ErxTask`s
public class DefaultErxTaskCoreDataStore: ErxTaskCoreDataStore {

../Sources/eRpLocalStorage/Profiles/ProfileCoreDataStore.swift:13

CoreDataStore adapter for Profiles

/// Store for fetching, creating, updating or deleting `Profile`s on the provided `CoreDataController`
/// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_2#4] CoreDataStore adapter for `Profile`s
public class ProfileCoreDataStore: ProfileDataStore, CoreDataCrudable {

../Sources/eRpLocalStorage/ShipmentInfo/ShipmentInfoCoreDataStore.swift:13

CoreDataStore adapter for ShipmentInfoEntitys

/// Store for fetching, creating, updating or deleting `ShipmentInfoEntity`s on the provided `CoreDataController`
/// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_2#5] CoreDataStore adapter for `ShipmentInfoEntity`s
public class ShipmentInfoCoreDataStore: ShipmentInfoDataStore, CoreDataCrudable {

../Sources/eRpLocalStorage/AVSTransaction/AVSTransactionCoreDataStore.swift:13

CoreDataStore adapter for AVSTransactionEntitys

/// Store for fetching, creating, updating or deleting `AVSTransactionEntity`s on the provided `CoreDataController`
/// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_2#6] CoreDataStore adapter for `AVSTransactionEntity`s
public class AVSTransactionCoreDataStore: AVSTransactionDataStore, CoreDataCrudable {

../Sources/Pharmacy/ModelsR4.Bundle+Location.swift:18

Extension containing all FHIR related parsing for Pharmacies

/// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_2#7] Extension containing all FHIR related parsing for Pharmacies
extension ModelsR4.Bundle {

See all files named ModelsR4.Bundles+<TypeName> within eRpRemoteStorage Package to find all references for FD related FHIR parsing. All other files within the Module are either helpers or provide support for creating FHIR objects that may be sent to the FD.

O.Source_3

Original Requirement

Implementation

Error messages are localized using the Foundation.LocalizedError protocol. Search for LocalizedError to see all instances. Most errors are localized with static text, some errors contain server side error messages. User data is never used for error messages. Logging is only active on debug builds. See O.Plat_4 for reference.

O.Source_4

Original Requirement

Implementation

Exception handling in swift uses Errors to represent the exception. We use a custom protocol CodedError that is autogenerated for all error messages. Together with LocalizedError we create error messages that contain a user readable description as well as some technical identifiers to easily identify specific error scenarios and give better support. See CodedError.swift and CodedError.generated.swift for the protocol and the autogenerated implementations of it.

O.Source_5

Original Requirement

Implementation

As exceptions and errors are kind of the same construct in swift, this aspect is hard to answer. If a server responds with 401/403 we delete tokens or other security measures, because they are no longer valid anyways. While logging in via biometrics we create temporary data containers for the user certificate and key identifier, that are deleted if the process is not completed properly and kept if the process completes.

../Sources/IDP/IDPInterceptor.swift:72

invalidate/delete unauthorized token

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20167-02#5] invalidate/delete unauthorized token
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_5#2] invalidate/delete unauthorized token
self.session.invalidateAccessToken()

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:107

Invalidation means deleting the token

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_5#3] Invalidation means deleting the token
storage.set(token: nil)

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/CardWallReadCardDomain.Environment+Biometrics.swift:61

Creation of the pairing session

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_5#4] Creation of the pairing session
pairingSession = try sessionProvider.signatureProvider(for: profileID).createPairingSession()

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/CardWallReadCardDomain.Environment+Biometrics.swift:77

Failure will delete paring data

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21598,A_21595] Failure will delete paring data
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_5#5] Failure will delete paring data
_ = try? sessionProvider.signatureProvider(for: profileID).abort(pairingSession: pairingSession)

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/CardWallReadCardDomain.Environment+Biometrics.swift:130

Failure will delete paring data

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21598,A_21595] Failure will delete paring data
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_5#5] Failure will delete paring data
_ = try? sessionProvider.signatureProvider(for: profileID).abort(pairingSession: pairingSession)

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/CardWallReadCardDomain.Environment+Biometrics.swift:146

Failure will delete paring data

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21598,A_21595] Failure will delete paring data
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_5#5] Failure will delete paring data
_ = try? sessionProvider.signatureProvider(for: profileID).abort(pairingSession: pairingSession)

O.Source_6

Original Requirement

Implementation

Swift uses Automatic Reference Counting that does not require active memory management. Raw memory access is possible but only used for swift-OpenSSL dependency that wraps the c library.

O.Source_7

Original Requirement

Implementation

All sensitive data is handled via value types. After usage the swift runtime handles deletion of the in memory representation. There is no method known to securely overwrite value types. Security is ensured by operating system and process boundaries. Secure enclave encryption keys can never leave the secure enclave by design.

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:22

Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19186]
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19188] Deletion of data saved here is managed by the OS.
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21322] Storage implementation uses iOS Keychain
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21595] Storage Implementation
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_8#1,O.Arch_4#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_7#2,O.Data_2#2,O.Auth_13#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
class KeychainStorage: SecureUserDataStore, IDPStorage, SecureEGKCertificateStorage {

O.Source_8

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use swift macros to remove development code. Configuration of server Environments is done within AppConfiguration.swift. A debug menu is available within settings, rooted within SettingsView.swift. UI-Test Scenarios are placed within the application, but exclude for production builds.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsView.swift:21

Debug menu is only visible on debug builds

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_8#3] Debug menu is only visible on debug builds
#if ENABLE_DEBUG_VIEW

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsView.swift:187

DebugSectionView is only available on debug builds

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_8#4] DebugSectionView is only available on debug builds
private struct DebugSectionView: View {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/DebugView/DebugView.swift:14

DebugView is only available on debug builds

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_8#5] DebugView is only available on debug builds
struct DebugView: View {

O.Source_9

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use common defaults for all compiler security related settings. See Xcode build configuration for eRpApp Target using current Xcode for actual settings.

O.Source_10

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use an external SAST and SCA tool that is run at least on every release build. See Jenkinsfile_SAST for technical details. There is additional integration into our merge-reqeuest tooling.

O.TrdP_1

Original Requirement

Implementation

Dependencies are handled with SPM. A technical description of all dependencies can be found within dependencies.yml. In the future, a generated SBOM will replace the Package.resolved for this purpose.

O.TrdP_2

Original Requirement

Implementation

Dependencies are updated regulary by an organizational process. Any dependency security issues raised by automatic checking are handled immediately. A list of all compiled dependencies can be found within dependencies.yml.

O.TrdP_3

Original Requirement

Implementation

SCA Scans are part of our release pipeline, see O.Source_10.

O.TrdP_4

Original Requirement

Implementation

Library updates are done by a manual periodic process. If any security issues arise and no fix is expected to be provided, a manual fork of external libraries is implemented. In our documentation, we define a bug bar and a grace period depending on the criticality of the vulnerability. Our bug bar is set to “Low”, see scripts/sast, lines including severity-threshold=low.

O.TrdP_5

Original Requirement

Implementation

Actual dependencies can be found within eRp-App.xcodeproj/project.xcworkspace/xcshareddata/swiftpm/Package.resolved, containing pinned versions with corresponding hashes. Library updates always require manual interaction to update the *.resolved files. We use very few providers of libraries and try to avoid any unnecessary dependency. Each providing party/dependency is evaluated by looking at GitHub metrics like open issues, stars and activity in general.

O.TrdP_6

Original Requirement

Implementation

We do not share sensitive data with third parties. See data usages within O.Purp_8 and O.Arch_2.

O.TrdP_7

Original Requirement

Implementation

See O.Source_1 and O.Arch_5.

O.TrdP_8

Original Requirement

Implementation

As most libraries are source code dependencies, these scans are part of SAST Scanning. Libraries that are not source code dependencies are the precompiled OpenSSL and OpenHealthCardKit (own library but different repository). All third party libraries are mirrored into internal repositories. If necessary we fork libraries to apply fixes.

gemSpec_FD_eRp

A_19145

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/PrescriptionList/Model/Prescription.swift:220

prevent deletion while task is in progress

// [REQ:gemSpec_FD_eRp:A_19145] prevent deletion while task is in progress
return erxTask.status != .inProgress

A_21267

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/PrescriptionList/Model/Prescription.swift:30

direct assignment

// [REQ:gemSpec_FD_eRp:A_21267] direct assignment
var type: PrescriptionType = .regular

A_21360

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/PrescriptionList/Model/Prescription.swift:176

no redeem informations available for flowtype 169

// [REQ:gemSpec_FD_eRp:A_21360] no redeem informations available for flowtype 169
guard type != .directAssignment

A_22102

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/PrescriptionList/Model/Prescription.swift:212

prevent deletion of tasks with flowtype 169 while not completed

// [REQ:gemSpec_FD_eRp:A_22102] prevent deletion of tasks with flowtype 169 while not completed
guard type != .directAssignment

gemSpec_IDP_Dienst

A_21415

Original Requirement

Implementation

Pairing_Data ../Sources/IDP/Models/PairingData.swift:12

/// Structure for registering a biometric key. See `SignedPairingData` for sigend representation.
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Dienst:A_21415:Pairing_Data]
public struct PairingData: Claims, Codable {

Registration_Data ../Sources/IDP/Models/RegistrationData.swift:13

/// Bundles data needed for creating and verifiying a pairing.
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Dienst:A_21415:Registration_Data]
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21416] Data Structure
public struct RegistrationData: Claims, Codable {

Device_Information ../Sources/IDP/Models/RegistrationData.swift:39

/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Dienst:A_21415:Device_Information]
public struct DeviceInformation: Codable {

Device_Type ../Sources/IDP/Models/RegistrationData.swift:56

/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Dienst:A_21415:Device_Type]
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21591]
public struct DeviceType: Codable {

Encrypted_Registration_Data ../Sources/IDP/Models/RegistrationData.swift:104

Returns JWE encrypted Registration_Data

/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Dienst:A_21415:Encrypted_Registration_Data] Returns JWE encrypted Registration_Data
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21416] Encryption
func encrypted(with publicKey: BrainpoolP256r1.KeyExchange.PublicKey,

Signed_Pairing_Data ../Sources/IDP/Models/SignedPairingData.swift:12

/// Signed (with eGK) version of `PairingData`.
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Dienst:A_21415:Signed_Pairing_Data]
public struct SignedPairingData {

A_21450

Original Requirement

Implementation

Pairing_Entry ../Sources/IDP/Models/PairingEntry.swift:12

/// Represents stored data within the idp.
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Dienst:A_21450:Pairing_Entry]
public struct PairingEntry: Equatable, Codable {

gemSpec_IDP_Frontend

A_19908-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:634

Signature check

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Only implemented for brainpoolP256r1
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_19908-01] Signature check
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
guard let verified = try? challenge.challenge.verify(with: document.authentication.cert),

A_19937

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Common/ErrorLocalization/IDPError+Localization.swift:23

Localized description of server errors

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_19937#1,A_20605,A_20085] Localized description of server errors
case let .internal(error: error): return error.localizedDescription

../Sources/IDP/internal/RealIDPClient.swift:506

Decoding server errors

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_19937#2,A_20605] Decoding server errors
private static func responseError(for body: Data) -> IDPError {

../Sources/IDP/Models/IDPError.swift:85

Error formatting

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_19937#3,A_20605,A_20085] Error formatting
public var description: String {

A_19938-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

We support the smartcard idp.

../Sources/IDP/internal/RealIDPClient.swift:259

2xx HTTPCodes are treated as tokens

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_19938-01#2|3] 2xx HTTPCodes are treated as tokens
if status.isSuccessful {
    return try JSONDecoder().decode(TokenPayload.self, from: body)
} else {

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:204

Decrypt, fails if wrong aes key

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_19938-01#3|3,A_20283-01|3] Decrypt, fails if wrong aes key
guard let decrypted = try? token.decrypted(with: self.cryptoBox.aesKey) else {
    return Fail(error: IDPError.decryption).eraseToAnyPublisher()
}

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:227

Usage

idToken: decrypted.idToken, // [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_19938-01#4] Usage
ssoToken: exchange.sso,

A_20068-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

: Implemented by not deactivating ATS within Info.plist, path: NSAppTransportSecurity.

A_20079

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/internal/RealIDPClient.swift:267

Network timeouts will traverse the queue as HTTPErrors.

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20079] Network timeouts will traverse the queue as `HTTPError`s.
$0.asIDPError()

A_20085

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/Models/IDPError.swift:85

Error formatting

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_19937#3,A_20605,A_20085] Error formatting
public var description: String {

../Sources/eRpApp/Common/ErrorLocalization/IDPError+Localization.swift:13

Error localization is not done yet, this is the place to localize

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20085] Error localization is not done yet, this is the place to localize
// accordingly.
switch self {

../Sources/eRpApp/Common/ErrorLocalization/IDPError+Localization.swift:23

Localized description of server errors

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_19937#1,A_20605,A_20085] Localized description of server errors
case let .internal(error: error): return error.localizedDescription

A_20283-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:225

Usage

accessToken: decrypted.accessToken, // [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20283-01] Usage
expires: self.time().addingTimeInterval(TimeInterval(token.expiresIn)),

A_20309

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:612

generation and hashing for codeChallenge

// Generate a verifierCode
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20309] generation and hashing for codeChallenge
guard let verifierCode = try? self.cryptoBox.generateRandomVerifier(),

../Sources/IDP/internal/IDPCrypto.swift:68

verifierLength is 32 bytes, encoded to base64 this results in 43 chars

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20309] verifierLength is 32 bytes, encoded to base64 this results in 43 chars
// (32 * 4 / 3 = 42,6)
try randomGenerator(verifierLength).encodeBase64urlsafe().utf8string

A_20483

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:620

Requesting the challange for the session

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20483#2|8] Requesting the challange for the session
return self.client.requestChallenge(
    codeChallenge: codeChallenge,
    method: .sha256,
    state: state,
    nonce: nonce,
    using: document,
    redirect: redirect
)

../Sources/IDP/internal/RealIDPClient.swift:100

Fill all the values into the GET Request

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20483#3|15] Fill all the values into the GET Request
let queryItems = [
    // [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20603,A_20601,A_20601-01] Transfer
    URLQueryItem(name: "client_id", value: clientConfig.clientId.urlPercentEscapedString()),
    URLQueryItem(name: "code_challenge", value: codeChallenge.urlPercentEscapedString()),
    URLQueryItem(name: "code_challenge_method", value: method.rawValue.urlPercentEscapedString()),
    URLQueryItem(name: "state", value: state.urlPercentEscapedString()),
    URLQueryItem(name: "scope", value: clientConfig.scopes.joined(separator: " ").urlPercentEscapedString()),
    URLQueryItem(name: "response_type", value: "code"),
    URLQueryItem(name: "nonce", value: nonce.urlPercentEscapedString()),
    URLQueryItem(
        // [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20740] transfer
        name: "redirect_uri",
        value: (redirect ?? clientConfig.redirectURI.absoluteString).urlPercentEscapedString()
    ),
]

A_20499

Original Requirement

Implementation

Not applicable as authenticator module is within FdV, not 3rd party app.

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:247

Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20499,A_20499-1#3] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20186] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
set(can: nil)

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/ProfileSecureDataWiper.swift:40

Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20499,A_20499-01#2] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20186] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21603] Certificate
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_14#4] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
storage.wipe()

A_20499-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/Profiles/Edit/EditProfileDomain.swift:255

Call the SSO_TOKEN removal upon manual logout

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20499-01#1] Call the SSO_TOKEN removal upon manual logout
return .run { [profileId = state.profileId] _ in

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/ProfileSecureDataWiper.swift:40

Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20499,A_20499-01#2] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20186] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21603] Certificate
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_14#4] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
storage.wipe()

A_20499-1

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:247

Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20499,A_20499-1#3] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20186] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
set(can: nil)

A_20512

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/Models/DiscoveryDocument.swift:181

Validation by expiration date checking + maximum of 24h window

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#2|5] Validation by expiration date checking + maximum of 24h window
func isValid(on date: Date) -> Bool {
    date <= expiresOn &&
        date >= createdOn &&
        date <= createdOn.addingTimeInterval(60 * 60 * 24)
}

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:278

Reset expired documents before loading a new one

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#3] Reset expired documents before loading a new one
self.storage.set(discovery: nil)

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:122

Testing the implementation

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#10] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromStorageOnInitFailesWhenTrustStoreFailsValidation() {

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:147

Testing the implementation

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#11] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromRemoteOnInitFailesWhenTrustStoreFailsValidation() {

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:172

Testing the implementation

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#12] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromStorageOnInitFailesWhenTrustStoreThrows() {

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:197

Testing the implementation

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#13] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromRemoteOnInitFailesWhenTrustStoreThrows() {

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:222

Testing the implementation

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#14] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromStorageOnInit() {

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:246

Testing the implementation

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#15] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromRemoteOnInit() {

A_20525

Original Requirement

Implementation

Not applicable as authenticator module is within FdV, not 3rd party app

Not applicable as authenticator module is within FdV. Consent is given by using the app.

A_20526-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:153

Encryption with JWE

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20526-01] Encryption with JWE
guard let jwe = try? signedChallenge.encrypt(with: document.encryptionPublicKey,

../Sources/IDP/Models/IDPChallengeSession.swift:86

Embed certificate

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20526-01] Embed certificate
let header = JWT.Header(alg: alg, x5c: certificates, typ: "JWT", cty: "NJWT")

../Sources/IDP/internal/RealIDPClient.swift:147

Building and sending the request

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20526-01] Building and sending the request
var request = URLRequest(url: document.authentication.url, cachePolicy: .reloadIgnoringCacheData)

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/CardWallReadCardDomain.Environment+Profile.swift:76

sign and verify with idp

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20172]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20526-01] sign and verify with idp
func signChallengeWithNFCCard(

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/CardWallReadCardDomain.Environment+Profile.swift:108

verify with idp

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20172]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20526-01] verify with idp
func verifyResultWithIDP(

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:268

sign

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20526-01] sign
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20700-07] sign
func sign(

A_20527

Original Requirement

Implementation

Not directly applicable as authenticator module is within FdV, not 3rd party app. AUTHORIZATION_CODE will be used directly.

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:166

Returning the AUTHORIZATION_CODE

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20527] Returning the AUTHORIZATION_CODE
return Just(exchangeToken).setFailureType(to: IDPError.self).eraseToAnyPublisher()

A_20529-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

We support the smartcard idp.

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:184

Encrypting the KEY_VERIFIER

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20529-01#2|6] Encrypting the `KEY_VERIFIER`
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21323,A_21324#1|6] Crypto box contains `Token-Key`
guard let encryptedKeyVerifier = try? KeyVerifier(
    with: self.cryptoBox.aesKey,
    codeVerifier: challengeSession.verifierCode
).encrypted(with: document.encryptionPublicKey, using: self.cryptoBox) else {
    return Fail(error: IDPError.encryption).eraseToAnyPublisher()
}

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:192

Sending encrypted KEY_VERIFIER and AUTHORIZATION_CODE.

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20529-01#3|7] Sending encrypted `KEY_VERIFIER` and `AUTHORIZATION_CODE`.
return self.client.exchange(
    token: exchange,
    verifier: challengeSession.verifierCode,
    redirectURI: exchange.redirect,
    encryptedKeyVerifier: encryptedKeyVerifier,
    using: document
)

../Sources/IDP/internal/RealIDPClient.swift:243

Putting all parameters into the HTTP body

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20529-01#4|10] Putting all parameters into the HTTP body
let parameters = [
    "key_verifier": keyVerifierJWEString,
    "code": token.code,
    "grant_type": "authorization_code",
    // [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20740] transfer
    "redirect_uri": redirectURI ?? clientConfig.redirectURI.absoluteString,
    "code_verifier": verifier,
    // [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20603] transfer
    "client_id": clientConfig.clientId,
]

../Sources/IDP/internal/RealIDPClient.swift:256

Sending the Request with the default HTTPClient via TLS.

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20529-01#5] Sending the Request with the default HTTPClient via TLS.
return httpClient.send(request: request)

A_20600

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/internal/RealIDPClient.swift:174

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20600]
return IDPExchangeToken(

../Sources/IDP/internal/RealIDPClient.swift:491

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20600]
return IDPExchangeToken(code: code,

A_20601

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/internal/RealIDPClient.swift:102

Transfer

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20603,A_20601,A_20601-01] Transfer
URLQueryItem(name: "client_id", value: clientConfig.clientId.urlPercentEscapedString()),

A_20601-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/internal/RealIDPClient.swift:102

Transfer

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20603,A_20601,A_20601-01] Transfer
URLQueryItem(name: "client_id", value: clientConfig.clientId.urlPercentEscapedString()),

A_20602

Original Requirement

Implementation

Authorization-Header setup of HTTP requests is done via interceptor pattern for every request.

../Sources/IDP/IDPInterceptor.swift:56

Setup Authorization-Header.

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20602#2,A_21325#1] Setup `Authorization-Header`.
request.setValue("\(token.tokenType) \(token.accessToken)", forHTTPHeaderField: "Authorization")

A_20603

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/internal/RealIDPClient.swift:102

Transfer

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20603,A_20601,A_20601-01] Transfer
URLQueryItem(name: "client_id", value: clientConfig.clientId.urlPercentEscapedString()),

../Sources/IDP/internal/RealIDPClient.swift:251

transfer

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20603] transfer
"client_id": clientConfig.clientId,

../Sources/eRpApp/AppConfiguration.swift:33

Actual ID

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20603] Actual ID
private static let defaultClientId: String = "eRezeptApp"

../Sources/eRpApp/AppConfiguration.swift:80

Actual ID

// clientId
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20603] Actual ID
let clientId: String = defaultClientId

A_20605

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/Models/IDPError.swift:85

Error formatting

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_19937#3,A_20605,A_20085] Error formatting
public var description: String {

../Sources/IDP/internal/RealIDPClient.swift:506

Decoding server errors

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_19937#2,A_20605] Decoding server errors
private static func responseError(for body: Data) -> IDPError {

../Sources/eRpApp/Common/ErrorLocalization/IDPError+Localization.swift:23

Localized description of server errors

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_19937#1,A_20605,A_20085] Localized description of server errors
case let .internal(error: error): return error.localizedDescription

A_20606

Original Requirement

Implementation

TLS is enforced by the platform for every HTTP connection. Certain domains can be excluded from this rule by listing them in a dedicated NSAppTransportSecurity exception list. This list is empty for our application.

../Sources/HTTPClient/DefaultHTTPClient.swift:34

Setup of minimum TLS Version to use.

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4385,A_18467,A_18464,GS-A_4387]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20606#2] Setup of minimum TLS Version to use.
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20206]
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Ntwk_2#2,O.Ntwk_3#2,O.Ntwk_7#2] URLSession is used as Network Framework
urlSessionConfiguration.tlsMinimumSupportedProtocolVersion = .TLSv12

A_20607

Original Requirement

Implementation

no exceptions set in NSAppTransportSecurity, HTTP via TLS is enforced; OS will use system root certificates in combination with set pinned certificates. see also: Requirements for Connecting Using ATS

A_20608-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

: Implemented by not deactivating ATS within Info.plist, path: NSAppTransportSecurity.

A_20609

Original Requirement

Implementation

no exceptions set in NSAppTransportSecurity, HTTP via TLS is enforced; OS will use system root certificates in combination with set pinned certificates. see also: Requirements for Connecting Using ATS

: Implemented by not deactivating ATS within Info.plist, path: NSAppTransportSecurity.

A_20614

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:266

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01,A_20623,A_20614]
.validateOrNil(with: trustStoreSession, timeProvider: time)

A_20617-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:244

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#15] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromRemoteOnInit() {

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:299

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01,A_20623]
.validate(with: self.trustStoreSession, timeProvider: self.time)

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:696

/// Returns a Publisher that validates the input streams discoveryDocument against the given trustStoreSession. If
/// the validity cannot be verified, the publisher fails with an `IDPError.trustStore` error.
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
///
/// - Parameter trustStoreSession: `TrustStoreSession` that is used to check the validity and trust of the
/// discoveryDocument.
/// - Returns: An AnyPublisher of `DiscoveryDocument`and `IDPError`
func validate(with trustStoreSession: TrustStoreSession,

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:728

/// Returns a Publisher that validates the input streams discoveryDocument and returns nil if validity cannot be
/// checked. All Errors are caught and result in an empty discoveryDocument.
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01,A_20623]
///
/// - Parameters:
///   - trustStoreSession: `TrustStoreSession` that is used to check the validity and trust of the disoveryDocument.
///   - time: Time provider to check the discovery document against.
/// - Returns: An AnyPublisher of `DiscoveryDocument`and `Never`.
func validateOrNil(with trustStoreSession: TrustStoreSession,

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:120

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#10] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromStorageOnInitFailesWhenTrustStoreFailsValidation() {

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:145

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#11] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromRemoteOnInitFailesWhenTrustStoreFailsValidation() {

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:170

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#12] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromStorageOnInitFailesWhenTrustStoreThrows() {

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:195

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#13] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromRemoteOnInitFailesWhenTrustStoreThrows() {

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:220

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#14] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromStorageOnInit() {

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:266

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01,A_20623,A_20614]
.validateOrNil(with: trustStoreSession, timeProvider: time)

A_20618

Original Requirement

Implementation

no exceptions set in NSAppTransportSecurity, HTTP via TLS is enforced; OS will use system root certificates in combination with set pinned certificates. see also: Requirements for Connecting Using ATS

: Implemented by not deactivating ATS within Info.plist, path: NSAppTransportSecurity.

A_20623

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:245

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#15] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromRemoteOnInit() {

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:299

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01,A_20623]
.validate(with: self.trustStoreSession, timeProvider: self.time)

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:697

/// Returns a Publisher that validates the input streams discoveryDocument against the given trustStoreSession. If
/// the validity cannot be verified, the publisher fails with an `IDPError.trustStore` error.
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
///
/// - Parameter trustStoreSession: `TrustStoreSession` that is used to check the validity and trust of the
/// discoveryDocument.
/// - Returns: An AnyPublisher of `DiscoveryDocument`and `IDPError`
func validate(with trustStoreSession: TrustStoreSession,

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:700

Validation call

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623] Validation call
return trustStoreSession.validate(discoveryDocument: document)

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:728

/// Returns a Publisher that validates the input streams discoveryDocument and returns nil if validity cannot be
/// checked. All Errors are caught and result in an empty discoveryDocument.
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01,A_20623]
///
/// - Parameters:
///   - trustStoreSession: `TrustStoreSession` that is used to check the validity and trust of the disoveryDocument.
///   - time: Time provider to check the discovery document against.
/// - Returns: An AnyPublisher of `DiscoveryDocument`and `Never`.
func validateOrNil(with trustStoreSession: TrustStoreSession,

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:758

Validation

/// Returns a publisher that checks a discoveryDocument against the trust store. The Stream contains an output
/// boolean for the plain check or an TrustStoreError in case the TrustStoreSession sub streams failed.
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623] Validation
///
/// - Parameter discoveryDocument: The DiscoveryDocument that needs to be checked.
/// - Returns: A publisher that contains an output with the check value or an failure if the check failed
/// due to an underlying error.
func validate(discoveryDocument: DiscoveryDocument) -> AnyPublisher<Bool, TrustStoreError> {

../Sources/TrustStore/X509TrustStore.swift:179

oid check

} else if eeCert.contains(oidBytes: .oidIdpd) { // [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623,A_20625#4] oid check
    return (vauCerts, idpCerts + [eeCert])

../Sources/TrustStore/X509TrustStore.swift:193

IDP oid

case oidErpVau // 1.2.276.0.76.4.258 == 0x06082A8214004C048202
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623] IDP oid
case oidIdpd // 1.2.276.0.76.4.260 == 0x06082A8214004C048204
}

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:121

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#10] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromStorageOnInitFailesWhenTrustStoreFailsValidation() {

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:146

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#11] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromRemoteOnInitFailesWhenTrustStoreFailsValidation() {

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:171

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#12] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromStorageOnInitFailesWhenTrustStoreThrows() {

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:196

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#13] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromRemoteOnInitFailesWhenTrustStoreThrows() {

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:221

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20512#14] Testing the implementation
func testLoadDiscoveryDocumentFromStorageOnInit() {

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:266

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20617-01,A_20623,A_20614]
.validateOrNil(with: trustStoreSession, timeProvider: time)

A_20625

Original Requirement

Implementation

These checks are part of the DefaultIDPSession as part for the response parsing. If they fail, an error will be thrown.

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:211

Validate ID_TOKEN signature with C.FD.SIG.

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20625#2|4] Validate `ID_TOKEN` signature with `C.FD.SIG`.
guard let jwt = try? JWT(from: decrypted.idToken),
      (try? jwt.verify(with: document.signingCert)) ?? false else {
    return Fail(error: IDPError.invalidSignature("ID_TOKEN")).eraseToAnyPublisher()
}

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:759

C.FD.SIG-Certificate verification

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20625#3|4] `C.FD.SIG`-Certificate verification
.zip(validate(certificate: discoveryDocument.signingCert))
.map { isDiscKeyValid, isSigningCertValid -> Bool in
    isDiscKeyValid && isSigningCertValid
}

../Sources/TrustStore/X509TrustStore.swift:179

oid check

} else if eeCert.contains(oidBytes: .oidIdpd) { // [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20623,A_20625#4] oid check
    return (vauCerts, idpCerts + [eeCert])

A_20700-05

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:476

sign with C.CH.AUT

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20700-05,A_20700-07] sign with C.CH.AUT
let signedChallenge = try await idpChallengeSigner.sign(

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:522

sign with C.CH.AUT

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20700-05,A_20700-07] sign with C.CH.AUT
let signedChallenge = try await idpChallengeSigner.sign(

A_20700-07

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultSecureEnclaveSignatureProvider.swift:127

Biometrics only, other modes currently not supported

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20700-07] Biometrics only, other modes currently not supported
amr: [

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:269

sign

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20526-01] sign
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20700-07] sign
func sign(

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:476

sign with C.CH.AUT

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20700-05,A_20700-07] sign with C.CH.AUT
let signedChallenge = try await idpChallengeSigner.sign(

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:522

sign with C.CH.AUT

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20700-05,A_20700-07] sign with C.CH.AUT
let signedChallenge = try await idpChallengeSigner.sign(

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:590

perform signature with OpenHealthCardKit

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20700-07] perform signature with OpenHealthCardKit
card.sign(data: message)

A_20740

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/internal/RealIDPClient.swift:111

transfer

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20740] transfer
name: "redirect_uri",

../Sources/IDP/internal/RealIDPClient.swift:248

transfer

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20740] transfer
"redirect_uri": redirectURI ?? clientConfig.redirectURI.absoluteString,

../Sources/eRpApp/AppConfiguration.swift:82

Actual redirect uri

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20740] Actual redirect uri
let redirectUri = URL(string: "https://redirect.gematik.de/erezept")! // swiftlint:disable:this force_unwrapping
let extAuthRedirectUri = URL(

A_20741

Original Requirement

Implementation

Configuration within app-configuration.json, organizational process as in A_20603

A_21322

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:19

Storage implementation uses iOS Keychain

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19186]
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19188] Deletion of data saved here is managed by the OS.
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21322] Storage implementation uses iOS Keychain
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21595] Storage Implementation
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_8#1,O.Arch_4#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_7#2,O.Data_2#2,O.Auth_13#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
class KeychainStorage: SecureUserDataStore, IDPStorage, SecureEGKCertificateStorage {

A_21323

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:185

Crypto box contains Token-Key

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20529-01#2|6] Encrypting the `KEY_VERIFIER`
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21323,A_21324#1|6] Crypto box contains `Token-Key`
guard let encryptedKeyVerifier = try? KeyVerifier(
    codeVerifier: challengeSession.verifierCode
).encrypted(with: document.encryptionPublicKey, using: self.cryptoBox) else {
    return Fail(error: IDPError.encryption).eraseToAnyPublisher()
}

../Sources/IDP/internal/TokenPayload.swift:169

Encode into JSON object

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21323#2] Encode into JSON object
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21324#3] Encode into JSON object
guard let keyVerifierEncoded = try? KeyVerifier.jsonEncoder.encode(self) else {

../Sources/IDP/internal/IDPCrypto.swift:57

AES key generation via CryptoKit

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4389:1] 256bit GCM symmetric key
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19179#3] AES key generation via CryptoKit
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4368] AES key generation via CryptoKit
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21323#4] AES key generation via CryptoKit
aesKey: SymmetricKey = SymmetricKey(size: SymmetricKeySize(bitCount: 256))

A_21324

Original Requirement

Implementation

Token-key and code-verifier are encoded into an JSON object.

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:185

Crypto box contains Token-Key

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20529-01#2|6] Encrypting the `KEY_VERIFIER`
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21323,A_21324#1|6] Crypto box contains `Token-Key`
guard let encryptedKeyVerifier = try? KeyVerifier(
    codeVerifier: challengeSession.verifierCode
).encrypted(with: document.encryptionPublicKey, using: self.cryptoBox) else {
    return Fail(error: IDPError.encryption).eraseToAnyPublisher()
}

../Sources/IDP/internal/TokenPayload.swift:140

Token-key and code-verifier are encoded into KeyVerifier.

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21324#2] Token-key and code-verifier are encoded into KeyVerifier.
public struct KeyVerifier: Codable {

../Sources/IDP/internal/TokenPayload.swift:170

Encode into JSON object

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21323#2] Encode into JSON object
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21324#3] Encode into JSON object
guard let keyVerifierEncoded = try? KeyVerifier.jsonEncoder.encode(self) else {

A_21325

Original Requirement

Implementation

AccessToken is encyrpted for each network request to the Fachdienst via VAUClient module.

../Sources/IDP/IDPInterceptor.swift:56

Setup Authorization-Header.

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20602#2,A_21325#1] Setup `Authorization-Header`.
request.setValue("\(token.tokenType) \(token.accessToken)", forHTTPHeaderField: "Authorization")

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:86

Encryption of accessToken (here bearerToken)

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21325#2] Encryption of accessToken (here bearerToken)
func encrypt() throws -> Data {

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/StandardSessionContainer.swift:358

Interceptor order defines what is encrypted via VAU

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21325#2] Interceptor order defines what is encrypted via VAU
let interceptors: [Interceptor] = [

A_21326

Original Requirement

Implementation

ACCESS_TOKEN information is managed by IDPToken structure. See O.Plat_12 regarding secure deletion.

../Sources/IDP/Models/IDPToken.swift:12

Structure holding ACCESS_TOKEN and ID_TOKEN information

/// IDPToken
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21326#2,A_21327#2] Structure holding ACCESS_TOKEN and ID_TOKEN information
public struct IDPToken: Codable {

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:99

Triggered at every app start, profile change, pull to refresh

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21326#3,A_21327#3] Triggered at every app start, profile change, pull to refresh
autoRefreshedToken.map { token in

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:775

Triggered at every app start, profile change, pull to refresh

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21326#4,A_21327#4] Triggered at every app start, profile change, pull to refresh
func refreshIfExpired(session: DefaultIDPSession,

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:787

Either return a refreshed IDPToken

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21326#5,A_21327#5] Either return a refreshed IDPToken
//  (or nil in case of error) to overwrite the current one
guard let session = session else {

A_21327

Original Requirement

Implementation

ID_TOKEN information is managed by IDPToken structure. See O.Plat_12 regarding secure deletion.

../Sources/IDP/Models/IDPToken.swift:12

Structure holding ACCESS_TOKEN and ID_TOKEN information

/// IDPToken
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21326#2,A_21327#2] Structure holding ACCESS_TOKEN and ID_TOKEN information
public struct IDPToken: Codable {

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:99

Triggered at every app start, profile change, pull to refresh

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21326#3,A_21327#3] Triggered at every app start, profile change, pull to refresh
autoRefreshedToken.map { token in

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:775

Triggered at every app start, profile change, pull to refresh

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21326#4,A_21327#4] Triggered at every app start, profile change, pull to refresh
func refreshIfExpired(session: DefaultIDPSession,

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:787

Either return a refreshed IDPToken

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21326#5,A_21327#5] Either return a refreshed IDPToken
//  (or nil in case of error) to overwrite the current one
guard let session = session else {

A_21328

Original Requirement

Implementation

Keychain storage encrypts session tokens.

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/StandardSessionContainer.swift:90

Keychain storage encrypts session tokens

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21328#2] Keychain storage encrypts session tokens
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20184] Keychain storage encrypts session/ssl tokens
storage: secureUserStore,

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:124

KeychainStorage implementation

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20184]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21328#3] KeychainStorage implementation
let success: Bool

A_21414

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:323

Encrypt ACCESS_TOKEN when requesting the pairing endpoint

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21414] Encrypt ACCESS_TOKEN when requesting the pairing endpoint
guard let tokenJWT = try? JWT(from: token.accessToken),

A_21416

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:317

Encryption

/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21416] Encryption
guard let jwe = try? registrationData.encrypted(with: document.encryptionPublicKey,

../Sources/IDP/Models/RegistrationData.swift:14

Data Structure

/// Bundles data needed for creating and verifiying a pairing.
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Dienst:A_21415:Registration_Data]
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21416] Data Structure
public struct RegistrationData: Claims, Codable {

../Sources/IDP/Models/RegistrationData.swift:105

Encryption

/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Dienst:A_21415:Encrypted_Registration_Data] Returns JWE encrypted Registration_Data
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21416] Encryption
func encrypted(with publicKey: BrainpoolP256r1.KeyExchange.PublicKey,

A_21431

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:397

Encryption

/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21431] Encryption
guard let jwe = try? signedChallenge.encrypted(with: document.encryptionPublicKey,

../Sources/IDP/Models/SignedAuthenticationData.swift:35

exp header

/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21431] exp header
expiry: originalChallenge.challenge.exp,

A_21443

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:348

Encrypt ACCESS_TOKEN when requesting the unregister endpoint

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21443] Encrypt ACCESS_TOKEN when requesting the unregister endpoint
guard let tokenJWT = try? JWT(from: token.accessToken),

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:372

Encrypt ACCESS_TOKEN when requesting the list endpoint

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21443] Encrypt ACCESS_TOKEN when requesting the list endpoint
guard let tokenJWT = try? JWT(from: token.accessToken),

A_21574

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/Login/CardWallLoginOptionDomain.swift:101

Present user information

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21574] Present user information
return Effect.send(.presentSecurityWarning)

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/Login/CardWallLoginOptionView.swift:94

Actual view

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21574] Actual view
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Resi_1#3] View containing information regarding the login options.
struct PrivacyWarningViewContainer: View {

A_21576

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:341

deletion call

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21576] deletion call
public func unregisterDevice(_ keyIdentifier: String, token: IDPToken) -> AnyPublisher<Bool, IDPError> {

A_21578

Original Requirement

Implementation

iOS only allows Biometric access via secure enclave or higher order apis.

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:145

Enforced via access attribute

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21578,A_21579,A_21580,A_21583] Enforced via access attribute
kSecAttrTokenID as String: kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave,

A_21579

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:145

Enforced via access attribute

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21578,A_21579,A_21580,A_21583] Enforced via access attribute
kSecAttrTokenID as String: kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave,

A_21580

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:145

Enforced via access attribute

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21578,A_21579,A_21580,A_21583] Enforced via access attribute
kSecAttrTokenID as String: kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave,

A_21581

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:141

Algorithm selection

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21581,A_21589] Algorithm selection
kSecAttrKeyType as String: kSecAttrKeyTypeECSECPrimeRandom,

A_21582

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:128

method selection

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21582] method selection
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21587] via `.privateKeyUsage`
[.privateKeyUsage,

A_21583

Original Requirement

Implementation

Secure Enclave is enforced with code attributes.

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:145

Enforced via access attribute

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21578,A_21579,A_21580,A_21583] Enforced via access attribute
kSecAttrTokenID as String: kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave,

A_21584

Original Requirement

Implementation

There is no API to allow or disallow an biometric authentication, iOS is handling the authorization process while using the private key for any cryptographic operation.

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:236

private key usage triggers biometric unlock

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21584] private key usage triggers biometric unlock
guard let signature = SecKeyCreateSignature(privateKey,

A_21585

Original Requirement

Implementation

Default behavior for all apps when using private access group (https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services/keychain_items/sharing_access_to_keychain_items_among_a_collection_of_apps)

A_21586

Original Requirement

Implementation

iOS will delete all user related data after user-account reset. Key-Chain data is not being synced with iCloud since kSecAttrSynchronizable is not applied

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:125

prevents migration to other devices

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21586] prevents migration to other devices
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Data_15#2] prevents migration to other devices
kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly,

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:132

invalidates biometry after changes

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21586] invalidates biometry after changes
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_5#2] Key invalidates on changes of registered
// biometric features
.biometryCurrentSet], &error) else {

A_21587

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:129

via .privateKeyUsage

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21582] method selection
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21587] via `.privateKeyUsage`
[.privateKeyUsage,

A_21588

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultSecureEnclaveSignatureProvider.swift:13

key identfier generator, number of bytes 32

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21588] key identfier generator, number of bytes 32
keyIdentifierGenerator: @escaping (() throws -> Data) = { try generateSecureRandom(length: 32) },

../Sources/IDP/DefaultSecureEnclaveSignatureProvider.swift:36

Key generation

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21588] Key generation
let keyIdentifier = try keyIdentifierGenerator()

../Sources/IDP/DefaultSecureEnclaveSignatureProvider.swift:101

usage as base64 encoded string

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21588] usage as base64 encoded string
guard let someIdentifier = identifier,

A_21589

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:141

Algorithm selection

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21581,A_21589] Algorithm selection
kSecAttrKeyType as String: kSecAttrKeyTypeECSECPrimeRandom,

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:143

Key length

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21589] Key length
kSecAttrKeySizeInBits as String: 256,

A_21590

Original Requirement

Implementation

References of SecureEnclaveSignatureProvider is limited to registration and altVerify usage.

../Sources/IDP/PrivateKeyContainer.swift:18

This is the container to represent biometric keys. Usage is limited to

/// Represents a (SecureEnclave) private key, namely `PrK_SE_AUT`, secured by iOS Biometrics.
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21590] This is the container to represent biometric keys. Usage is limited to
/// authorization purposes
/// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_7#2] Container for private key operations using secure enclave private keys
public struct PrivateKeyContainer {

A_21591

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/Models/RegistrationData.swift:57

/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Dienst:A_21415:Device_Type]
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21591]
public struct DeviceType: Codable {

../Sources/IDP/UIDevice+Extension.swift:10

/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21591,A_21600]
func deviceInformation() -> RegistrationData.DeviceInformation {

../Sources/IDP/UIDevice+Extension.swift:43

/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21591,A_21600]
func deviceInformation() -> RegistrationData.DeviceInformation {

A_21595

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:231

Store within keychain

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21595] Store within keychain
success = try keychainHelper.setGenericPassword(keyIdentifier, for: idpBiometricKeyIdentifier)

../Sources/IDP/DefaultSecureEnclaveSignatureProvider.swift:51

Store pairing data

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21598,A_21595,A_21595] Store pairing data
certificateStorage.set(certificate: certificate)

../Sources/IDP/DefaultSecureEnclaveSignatureProvider.swift:72

case deletion

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21595] case deletion
certificateStorage.set(certificate: nil)

../Sources/IDP/IDPStorage.swift:12

Storage Protocol

/// Interface to access an eGK Certificate that should be kept private
/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21595] Storage Protocol
public protocol SecureEGKCertificateStorage {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/CardWallReadCardDomain.Environment+Biometrics.swift:76

Failure will delete paring data

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21598,A_21595] Failure will delete paring data
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_5#5] Failure will delete paring data
_ = try? sessionProvider.signatureProvider(for: profileID).abort(pairingSession: pairingSession)

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/CardWallReadCardDomain.Environment+Biometrics.swift:129

Failure will delete paring data

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21598,A_21595] Failure will delete paring data
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_5#5] Failure will delete paring data
_ = try? sessionProvider.signatureProvider(for: profileID).abort(pairingSession: pairingSession)

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/CardWallReadCardDomain.Environment+Biometrics.swift:145

Failure will delete paring data

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21598,A_21595] Failure will delete paring data
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_5#5] Failure will delete paring data
_ = try? sessionProvider.signatureProvider(for: profileID).abort(pairingSession: pairingSession)

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:20

Storage Implementation

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19186]
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19188] Deletion of data saved here is managed by the OS.
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21322] Storage implementation uses iOS Keychain
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21595] Storage Implementation
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_8#1,O.Arch_4#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_7#2,O.Data_2#2,O.Auth_13#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
class KeychainStorage: SecureUserDataStore, IDPStorage, SecureEGKCertificateStorage {

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:204

Store within keychain

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21595] Store within keychain
_ = try? keychainHelper.setGenericPassword(derBytes, for: egkAuthCertIdentifier)

../Sources/IDP/DefaultSecureEnclaveSignatureProvider.swift:51

Store pairing data

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21598,A_21595,A_21595] Store pairing data
certificateStorage.set(certificate: certificate)

A_21598

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultSecureEnclaveSignatureProvider.swift:51

Store pairing data

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21598,A_21595,A_21595] Store pairing data
certificateStorage.set(certificate: certificate)

../Sources/IDP/DefaultSecureEnclaveSignatureProvider.swift:69

Delete all stored keys/identifiers/certificate in case of an unsuccessful

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21598] Delete all stored keys/identifiers/certificate in case of an unsuccessful
// registration
public func abort(pairingSession: PairingSession) throws {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/CardWallReadCardDomain.Environment+Biometrics.swift:76

Failure will delete paring data

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21598,A_21595] Failure will delete paring data
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_5#5] Failure will delete paring data
_ = try? sessionProvider.signatureProvider(for: profileID).abort(pairingSession: pairingSession)

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/CardWallReadCardDomain.Environment+Biometrics.swift:129

Failure will delete paring data

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21598,A_21595] Failure will delete paring data
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_5#5] Failure will delete paring data
_ = try? sessionProvider.signatureProvider(for: profileID).abort(pairingSession: pairingSession)

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/CardWallReadCardDomain.Environment+Biometrics.swift:145

Failure will delete paring data

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21598,A_21595] Failure will delete paring data
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_5#5] Failure will delete paring data
_ = try? sessionProvider.signatureProvider(for: profileID).abort(pairingSession: pairingSession)

A_21600

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/UIDevice+Extension.swift:10

/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21591,A_21600]
func deviceInformation() -> RegistrationData.DeviceInformation {

../Sources/IDP/UIDevice+Extension.swift:43

/// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21591,A_21600]
func deviceInformation() -> RegistrationData.DeviceInformation {

A_21603

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:251

Certificate

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21603] Certificate
set(certificate: nil)

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/ProfileSecureDataWiper.swift:42

Certificate

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20499,A_20499-01#2] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20186] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21603] Certificate
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_14#4] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
storage.wipe()

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/ProfileSecureDataWiper.swift:48

key identifier

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21603] key identifier
storage.set(keyIdentifier: nil)

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/ProfileSecureDataWiper.swift:55

PrK_SE_AUT/PuK_SE_AUT

// If deletion fails we cannot do anything
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21603] PrK_SE_AUT/PuK_SE_AUT
_ = try? PrivateKeyContainer.deleteExistingKey(for: identifier)

A_22294-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ExtAuth/CardWallExtAuthConfirmationDomain.swift:90

Start login via gID

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22294-01] Start login via gID
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_4#9,O.Plat_10#2] Start login via gID
return .publisher(

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ExtAuth/CardWallExtAuthSelectionDomain.swift:91

Select KK

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_4#6] Business logic of user selecting the insurance company
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22294-01] Select KK
state.selectedKK = entry

A_22295-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:452

Usage of kk_app_id

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22295-01] Usage of kk_app_id
let extAuth = IDPExtAuth(kkAppId: entry.identifier,

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:986

Test

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22295-01] Test
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22299-01] Test
func testStartExtAuth() throws {

A_22296-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:421

Signature verification

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22296-01] Signature verification
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_23082#3] Signature verification
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Resi_6#3] Discovery Document signature verification
guard try jwtContainer.verify(with: document.discKey) == true else {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ExtAuth/CardWallExtAuthSelectionDomain.swift:72

Load available apps

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22296-01] Load available apps
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_23082#2] Load available apps
return .publisher(

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:953

Test

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22296-01] Test
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_23082#4] Test
func testLoadDirectoryKKAppsInvalidSignature() throws {

A_22299-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:469

Remember State parameter for later verification

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22299-01] Remember State parameter for later verification
guard let components = URLComponents(url: redirectUrl, resolvingAgainstBaseURL: true),

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ExtAuth/CardWallExtAuthConfirmationDomain.swift:105

Follow redirect

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22299-01] Follow redirect
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Plat_10#3] Follow redirect
guard environment.resourceHandler.canOpenURL(url) else {

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:987

Test

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22295-01] Test
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22299-01] Test
func testStartExtAuth() throws {

A_22301-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/SceneDelegate.swift:227

If app needs reauthentication routing starts here.

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22301-01#2] If app needs reauthentication routing starts here.
self.routeTo(.universalLink(url))

../Sources/eRpApp/SceneDelegate.swift:260

If app is already started, routing starts here.

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22301-01#3] If app is already started, routing starts here.
routeTo(.universalLink(url))

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/AppStartDomain.swift:224

App2App gID will trigger this case

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22301-01#4] App2App gID will trigger this case
case "/extauth":

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/AppStartDomain.swift:234

set actual destination in main tab

// // [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22301-01#5] set actual destination in main tab
await send(.destination(.app(.main(action: .externalLogin(url)))))

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/MainDomain.swift:258

Redirect into ExtAuthPendingDomain

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_1#7] redirect into correct domain
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22301-01#6|3] Redirect into ExtAuthPendingDomain
return .run { send in
}
case let .importTaskByUrl(url):

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/ExtAuth/ExtAuthPendingDomain.swift:157

Actual handling of the universal link, user feedback via dialogs e.g.

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_1#8] Validate data by parsing url and only allowing predefined variables as String
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22301-01#7] Actual handling of the universal link, user feedback via dialogs e.g.
case let .externalLogin(url),

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/ExtAuth/ExtAuthPendingDomain.swift:169

Login part is handled by idpSesson

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22301-01#8|5] Login part is handled by idpSesson
environment.idpSession
    .extAuthVerifyAndExchange(
        url,
        idTokenValidator: idTokenValidator.validate(idToken:)
    )

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:490

Extract the components.

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22301-01#9|7] Extract the components.
guard let components = URLComponents(url: url, resolvingAgainstBaseURL: true),
      let code = components.queryItemWithName("code")?.value,
      let state = components.queryItemWithName("state")?.value else {
    return Fail(
        error: IDPError.internal(error: .extAuthVerifyAndExchangeMissingQueryItem)
    ).eraseToAnyPublisher()
}

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:501

Send authorization request

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22301-01#10] Send authorization request
return extAuthVerify(verify)

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:510

Check for existing challenge session

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22301-01#11] Check for existing challenge session
guard let challengeSession = extAuthRequestStorage.getExtAuthRequest(for: token.state) else {

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:477

The challenge session has been set here.

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22301-01#12] The challenge session has been set here.
self.extAuthRequestStorage.setExtAuthRequest(challengeSession, for: storageIdentifier)

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:1088

Negative Test

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22301-01#20] Negative Test
func testExtAuthVerifyAndExchangeFailesWithoutReferenceStateGID() throws {

A_22302-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

As of now idp_sek_2 can only be true, as the false case is no longer allowed. Thus only the true case is implemented in the following code places.

../Sources/IDP/internal/RealIDPClient.swift:461

Sending the required data as POST to the backend.

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22302-01#2] Sending the required data as POST to the backend.
func extAuthVerify(_ verify: IDPExtAuthVerify,

A_22313-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ExtAuth/CardWallExtAuthConfirmationDomain.swift:111

Universal link options

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22313-01] Universal link options
environment.resourceHandler.open(url, options: [.universalLinksOnly: false]) { result in

A_23082

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ExtAuth/CardWallExtAuthSelectionDomain.swift:73

Load available apps

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22296-01] Load available apps
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_23082#2] Load available apps
return .publisher(

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:422

Signature verification

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22296-01] Signature verification
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_23082#3] Signature verification
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Resi_6#3] Discovery Document signature verification
guard try jwtContainer.verify(with: document.discKey) == true else {

../Tests/IDPTests/DefaultIDPSessionTests.swift:954

Test

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_22296-01] Test
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_23082#4] Test
func testLoadDirectoryKKAppsInvalidSignature() throws {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ExtAuth/CardWallExtAuthSelectionView.swift:48

Display of KK apps

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_23082#5] Display of KK apps
if !store.filteredKKList.apps.isEmpty {

gemSpec_IDP_Sek

A_22299

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/Introduction/CardWallIntroductionDomain.swift:190

Follow redirect

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Sek:A_22299] Follow redirect
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Plat_10#3] Follow redirect
guard resourceHandler.canOpenURL(url) else {

A_22313-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/Introduction/CardWallIntroductionDomain.swift:196

Remember State parameter for later verification

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Sek:A_22313-01] Remember State parameter for later verification
resourceHandler.open(url, options: [:]) { result in

gemSpec_Krypt

A_17124

Original Requirement

Implementation

TLS is enforced by the platform for every HTTP connection. Certain domains can be excluded from this rule by listing them in a dedicated NSAppTransportSecurity exception list. This list is empty for our application, see also: Requirements for Connecting Using ATS

A_17205

Original Requirement

Implementation

The app does not use the TSL. All TSL related parts are handled within the eRp-FD.

A_17207

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:605

Assure only brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Assure only brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
var alg: JWT.Algorithm? {

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:288

Only implemented for brainpoolP256r1

// Validate JWT/DiscoveryDocument signature
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Only implemented for brainpoolP256r1
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Resi_6#4] Discovery Document signature verification
guard (try? fetchedDocument.backing.verify(with: fetchedDocument.discKey)) ?? false else {

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:633

Only implemented for brainpoolP256r1

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Only implemented for brainpoolP256r1
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_19908-01] Signature check
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
guard let verified = try? challenge.challenge.verify(with: document.authentication.cert),

../Sources/IDP/internal/JWT/JWTSignatureVerifier.swift:23

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207]
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02]
public func verify(signature raw: Data, message: Data) throws -> Bool {

../Sources/IDP/internal/JWT/JWTSignatureVerifier.swift:33

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207]
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
guard let key = brainpoolP256r1VerifyPublicKey() else {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:472

Assure only brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Assure only brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
let alg: JWT.Algorithm = .bp256r1

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:517

Assure only brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Assure only brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
guard let alg = autCertificateResponse.info.algorithm.alg

BrainpoolP256r1 parameter spec is used for creating/verifying key for signature usage; exception: Biometric use case uses secp256r1 (This is considered in its respective specification.)

A_17322

Original Requirement

Implementation

TLS is enforced by the platform for every HTTP connection. Certain domains can be excluded from this rule by listing them in a dedicated NSAppTransportSecurity exception list. This list is empty for our application, see also: Requirements for Connecting Using ATS

A_17359

Original Requirement

Implementation

Not applicable, since there is no exchange of CAdES-encoded documents signed by a ECC key in our system. Generally the created signatures adhere to A_17207 if not stated otherwise in the respective specifications.

A_17775

Original Requirement

Implementation

We cannot interfere with cipher suite lists, see Requirements for Connecting Using ATS for actual order.

A_18464

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/HTTPClient/DefaultHTTPClient.swift:33

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4385,A_18467,A_18464,GS-A_4387]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20606#2] Setup of minimum TLS Version to use.
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20206]
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Ntwk_2#2,O.Ntwk_3#2,O.Ntwk_7#2] URLSession is used as Network Framework
urlSessionConfiguration.tlsMinimumSupportedProtocolVersion = .TLSv12

A_18467

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/HTTPClient/DefaultHTTPClient.swift:33

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4385,A_18467,A_18464,GS-A_4387]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20606#2] Setup of minimum TLS Version to use.
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20206]
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Ntwk_2#2,O.Ntwk_3#2,O.Ntwk_7#2] URLSession is used as Network Framework
urlSessionConfiguration.tlsMinimumSupportedProtocolVersion = .TLSv12

A_19215

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use https only, see DefaultHTTPClient.swift. ATS forbids other connections.

A_20161-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:26

Encryption interface

/// Perform encryption of the data that the implementing instance has been initialized with
/// in order to send it to a VAU service endpoint. See: gemSpec_Krypt A_20161-01
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20161-01#2] Encryption interface
///
/// - Returns: Encrypted HTTPRequest as specified to be sent to a VAU endpoint
/// - Throws: `VAUError` in case of encryption failure
func encrypt() throws -> Data

../Sources/VAUClient/VAUInterceptor.swift:48

Encapsulate “real” HTTPRequest into VAU envelop

// Prepare outer request (encrypt original request and embed it into a new one)
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20161-01#3] Encapsulate "real" HTTPRequest into VAU envelop
.processToVauRequest(urlRequest: request, vauCryptoProvider: vauCryptoProvider)

../Sources/VAUClient/VAUInterceptor.swift:65

Encapsulate “real” HTTPRequest into VAU envelop

// Prepare outer request (encrypt original request and embed it into a new one)
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20161-01#4] Encapsulate "real" HTTPRequest into VAU envelop
func processToVauRequest(

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/URLRequest+Serialize.swift:14

1:

/// Serialize the request into a String that can be interpreted by the VAU server
/// - Note: A HTTP body is only included into the string representation when it is UTF-8 encoded.
/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20161-01#11] 1:
func encodeToRawString() throws -> String {

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:45

2: Request-ID Generator

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20161-01#12] 2: Request-ID Generator
let requestIdGenerator = { try VAURandom.generateSecureRandom(length: 16).hexStringLowerCase }

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:47

3: AES-Key Generator

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20161-01#13] 3: AES-Key Generator
let symmetricKeyGenerator = { SymmetricKey(size: SymmetricKeySize(bitCount: 128)) }

../Sources/VAUClient/VAUInterceptor.swift:92

4: vauCrypto is generating new entity and thus a new request/id everytime

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20161-01#14|5] 4: vauCrypto is generating new entity and thus a new request/id everytime
let vauCrypto = try vauCryptoProvider.provide(
    for: stringEncodedRequest,
    vauCertificate: vauCertificate,
    bearerToken: bearerToken
)

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:90

5:

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20161-01#15] 5:
guard let payload = "1 \(bearerToken) \(requestId) \(symKeyHex) \(message)".data(using: .utf8) else {

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:138

6a-g

/// Perform Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme [SEC1-2009] on some payload
/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20161-01#16] 6a-g
static func encrypt(

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUEndpointHandler.swift:17

7: VAU-Endpoint respects userpseudonym if present

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20161-01#17|10] 7: VAU-Endpoint respects userpseudonym if present
var vauEndpoint: AnyPublisher<URL, VAUError> {
    vauStorage.userPseudonym
        .map { userPseudonym in
            // If the client has yet not been assigned a user pseudonym, then default to "0".
            let userPseudonymPathComponent = userPseudonym ?? "0"
            return self.vauEndpoint(withLastComponent: userPseudonymPathComponent)
        }
        .setFailureType(to: VAUError.self)
        .eraseToAnyPublisher()
}

A_20163

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:34

/// Perform decryption and validation of given data with the secret key material the implementing instance holds.
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20163]
///
/// - Parameter data: Data to be decrypted
/// - Returns: Decrypted UTF8 string representation of the given data
/// - Throws: `VAUError` in case of decryption failure or when the decrypted data could not be validated
func decrypt(data: Data) throws -> String

A_20174

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/VAUClient/VAUInterceptor.swift:133

1: Check Content-Type

// Process VAU server response (validate and extract+decrypt inner FHIR service response)
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20174#11|12] 1: Check Content-Type
static func processVauResponse(httpResponse: HTTPResponse, vauCrypto: VAUCrypto, originalUrl: URL) throws
    guard httpResponse.status == .ok,
          httpResponse.response.value(forHTTPHeaderField: "Content-Type") == "application/octet-stream"
    else {
        return httpResponse
    }
    let extracted = httpResponse.data
    let decrypted = try vauCrypto.decrypt(data: extracted)
    let decoded = try decrypted.decodeToHTTPResponse(url: originalUrl)
    return decoded
}
}

../Sources/VAUClient/VAUInterceptor.swift:53

2: Handle userpseudonym

// Process VAU server response (validate and extract+decrypt inner FHIR service response)
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20174#12] 2: Handle userpseudonym
.handleUserPseudonym(vauEndpointHandler: self.vauEndpointHandler)

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUEndpointHandler.swift:34

2:

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20174#12] 2:
if let pseudonym = httpResponse.response.value(forHTTPHeaderField: "userpseudonym") {

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:115

3: Decrypt using AES symmetric key

// Steps according to gemSpec_Krypt A_20174
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20174#13] 3: Decrypt using AES symmetric key
guard let sealed = try? AES.GCM.SealedBox(combined: data),

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:122

4+5: Verify decrypted message. Expect: “1 <response header+body>“

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20174#14] 4+5: Verify decrypted message. Expect: "1 <request id> <response header+body>"
let separated = utf8.split(separator: " ", maxSplits: 2).map { String($0) }

../Sources/VAUClient/VAUInterceptor.swift:54

6: Remove the envelop

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20174#16] 6: Remove the envelop
.processVauResponse(vauCrypto: vauCrypto, originalUrl: originalUrl)

A_20175

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/VAUClient/VAUStorage.swift:11

VAUStorage provides a getter and a setter for user pseudonym

/// VAU Storage protocol
/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20175#1|7] VAUStorage provides a getter and a setter for user pseudonym
public protocol VAUStorage {
    var userPseudonym: AnyPublisher<String?, Never> { get }

    /// Set and save a user pseudonym
    /// - Parameter userPseudonym: value to save. Pass in nil to unset
    func set(userPseudonym: String?)
}

../Sources/VAUClient/VAUStorage.swift:20

Implementation of VAUStorage is using the Filesystem

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20175#2|2] Implementation of VAUStorage is using the Filesystem
public class FileVAUStorage: VAUStorage {
    let userPseudonymFilePath: URL

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/StandardSessionContainer.swift:154

Initialization of the VAUStorage at a predefined location in the filesystem

// Local VAU storage configuration
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_20175#3|10] Initialization of the VAUStorage at a predefined location in the filesystem
lazy var vauStorage: VAUStorage = {
        for: .documentDirectory,
        in: .userDomainMask,
        appropriateFor: nil,
        create: false
    )
    .appendingPathComponent("VauStorage") else {
        preconditionFailure("Could not create a filePath for the vau storage.")
    }
    return FileVAUStorage(vauStorageBaseFilePath: vauStorageFilePath)

A_20607

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use https only, see DefaultHTTPClient.swift. ATS forbids other connections.

A_21216

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/TrustStore/internal/CertList.swift:11

/// Data structure according to */CertList* endpoint
/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21216]
public struct CertList: Codable, Equatable {

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCertList.swift:11

/// Data structure according to */CertList* endpoint
/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21216]
public struct VAUCertList: Codable, Equatable {

A_21217

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/TrustStore/internal/OCSPList.swift:10

/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21217]
/// Data structure according to */OCSPList* endpoint
public struct OCSPList: Codable, Equatable {

A_21218

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Tests/TrustStoreTests/X509TrustStoreTests.swift:328

OCSP responder certificates must be verifiable by the trust store

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218] OCSP responder certificates must be verifiable by the trust store
func testCheckEeCertificatesStatus_failWhenResponsesCannotBeVerifiedByTrustStore() throws {

../Sources/TrustStore/DefaultTrustStoreSession.swift:68

DefaultTrustStoreSession coordinates loading and validity checking

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218,A_21222#2] `DefaultTrustStoreSession` coordinates loading and validity checking
extension DefaultTrustStoreSession: TrustStoreSession {

../Sources/TrustStore/DefaultTrustStoreSession.swift:179

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218]
func loadOCSPResponses() -> AnyPublisher<[OCSPResponse], TrustStoreError> {

../Sources/TrustStore/DefaultTrustStoreSession.swift:192

If only OCSP responses >12h available, we must request new ones

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218] If only OCSP responses >12h available, we must request new ones
ocspResponses

../Sources/TrustStore/DefaultTrustStoreSession.swift:210

If only OCSP responses >12h available, …

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218] If only OCSP responses >12h available, ...
ocspResponses

../Sources/TrustStore/DefaultTrustStoreSession.swift:234

If only OCSP responses >12h available, we must request new ones

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218] If only OCSP responses >12h available, we must request new ones
func allSatisfyNotProducedBefore(date: Date) -> Bool {

../Sources/TrustStore/TrustStoreSession.swift:13

/// TrustStoreSession acts as an interactor/mediator for the TrustStoreClient and TrustStoreStorage
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218,A_21222]
public protocol TrustStoreSession {

../Sources/TrustStore/X509TrustStore.swift:13

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218]
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20032-01]
// Category A: Cross root certificates
private let rootCa: X509

../Sources/TrustStore/X509TrustStore.swift:105

/// Match a collection of `OCSPResponse`s with the end entity certificates of this `X509TrustStore`.
/// Checks response status, revocation status for each certificate and validates the signer certificates of
///   the responses itself.
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218]
/// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20032-01]
///
/// - Note: This function assumes that up-to-dateness of the responses itself has already been checked.
///
/// - Returns: true on successful matching/validation, false if not successful or error
func checkEeCertificatesStatus(with ocspResponses: [OCSPResponse]) throws -> Bool {

../Sources/TrustStore/X509TrustStore.swift:103

OCSP responder certificates must be verifiable by the trust store

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218] OCSP responder certificates must be verifiable by the trust store
let verifiedOCSPResponses = basicVerifyFilter(ocspResponses: ocspResponses)

../Sources/TrustStore/X509TrustStore.swift:111

For every EE certificate there must be a matching OCSP response

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218] For every EE certificate there must be a matching OCSP response
let matchedResponses = try eeCertAndSignerTuple.map { eeCertificate, signer in

../Sources/TrustStore/X509TrustStore.swift:119

For every OCSP response there must be a matching EE certificate

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218] For every OCSP response there must be a matching EE certificate
let matchedEeCerts = try ocspResponses.map { response in

../Sources/TrustStore/X509TrustStore.swift:130

OCSP responder certificates must be verifiable by the trust store

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218] OCSP responder certificates must be verifiable by the trust store
private func basicVerifyFilter(ocspResponses: [OCSPResponse]) -> [OCSPResponse] {

(3) ../Sources/TrustStore/X509TrustStore.swift:151

Check ca_certs against category A certificates

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218:(3)] Check ca_certs against category A certificates
private static let caCertRegex =

(4) ../Sources/TrustStore/X509TrustStore.swift:168

Check ee_certs against category A+B certificates

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218:(4)] Check ee_certs against category A+B certificates
typealias VauAndIpdCerts = (vauCerts: [X509], idpCerts: [X509])

../Sources/eRpApp/AppConfiguration.swift:117

Gematik Root CA 3 as a trust anchor has to be set in the program code

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218] Gematik Root CA 3 as a trust anchor has to be set in the program code
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Ntwk_4#2|16] Gematik Root CA 3 as a trust anchor has to be set in the program code
// swiftlint:disable:next force_try
let TRUSTANCHOR_GemRootCa3 = try! TrustAnchor(withPEM: """

../Tests/TrustStoreTests/DefaultTrustStoreSessionTests.swift:125

If only OCSP responses >12h available, we must request new ones

// Advance the time so that saved mocked OCSP responses will be invalidated
// The same mocked OCSP responses will be received by the client cannot be validated,
//  so expect a session failure.
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218] If only OCSP responses >12h available, we must request new ones
currentDate = currentDate.advanced(by: TimeInterval(expirationInterval))

../Tests/TrustStoreTests/X509TrustStoreTests.swift:251

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218]
func testCheckCertificateStatus_FdEnc() throws {

../Tests/TrustStoreTests/X509TrustStoreTests.swift:270

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218]
func testCheckCertificateStatus_FdEncIdpSig1IdpSig3() throws {

../Tests/TrustStoreTests/X509TrustStoreTests.swift:290

For every EE certificate there must be a matching OCSP response

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218] For every EE certificate there must be a matching OCSP response
func testCheckCertificateStatus_failWhenOneEeCertHasNoMatchingResponse() throws {

../Tests/TrustStoreTests/X509TrustStoreTests.swift:309

For every OCSP response there must be a matching EE certificate

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218] For every  OCSP response there must be a matching EE certificate
func testCheckCertificateStatus_failWhenOneResponseHasNoMatchingEeCert() throws {

Note: grace period for OCSP responses is 12h

A_21222

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/TrustStore/TrustStoreSession.swift:13

/// TrustStoreSession acts as an interactor/mediator for the TrustStoreClient and TrustStoreStorage
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218,A_21222]
public protocol TrustStoreSession {

The TrustStoreSession protocol and the implementation DefaultTrustStoreSession provide interfaces for validating certificates. Validity of the IDP Certificates is always checked, as the discovery document is only available as a stream, and each access will trigger a validity check. FD Certificates

../Sources/TrustStore/DefaultTrustStoreSession.swift:68

DefaultTrustStoreSession coordinates loading and validity checking

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218,A_21222#2] `DefaultTrustStoreSession` coordinates loading and validity checking
extension DefaultTrustStoreSession: TrustStoreSession {

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:264

DiscoveryDocument is validated with the active trustStoreSession

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Resi_6#2] Implementation of loading the discovery document for fetching signature and
// encryption keys.
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21222#3] DiscoveryDocument is validated with the active trustStoreSession
private func loadDiscoveryDocument() -> AnyPublisher<DiscoveryDocument, IDPError> {

../Sources/VAUClient/VAUCertificate.swift:20

Vau Certificate provider

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21222#4|7] Vau Certificate provider
func loadAndVerifyVauCertificate() -> AnyPublisher<VAUCertificate, VAUError> {
    trustStoreSession.loadVauCertificate()
        .first()
        .mapError { $0.asVAUError() }
        .map { X509VAUCertificate(x509: $0) }
        .eraseToAnyPublisher()
}

../Sources/TrustStore/DefaultTrustStoreSession.swift:75

Loading of the whole trust store, filtering for vau certificate

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21222#5|5] Loading of the whole trust store, filtering for vau certificate
public func loadVauCertificate() -> AnyPublisher<X509, TrustStoreError> {
    loadOCSPCheckedTrustStore()
        .map(\.vauCert)
        .eraseToAnyPublisher()
}

A_21275

Original Requirement

Implementation

TLS is enforced by the platform for every HTTP connection. Certain domains can be excluded from this rule by listing them in a dedicated NSAppTransportSecurity exception list. This list is empty for our application, see also: Requirements for Connecting Using ATS

A_21275−01

Original Requirement

Implementation

TLS is enforced by the platform for every HTTP connection. Certain domains can be excluded from this rule by listing them in a dedicated NSAppTransportSecurity exception list. This list is empty for our application, see also: Requirements for Connecting Using ATS

A_21332-02

Original Requirement

Implementation

TLS is enforced by the platform for every HTTP connection. Certain domains can be excluded from this rule by listing them in a dedicated NSAppTransportSecurity exception list. This list is empty for our application, see also: Requirements for Connecting Using ATS

A_4389

Original Requirement

Implementation

1 ../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:94

IVs must not be reused, IVs bit length must be larger or equal to 96

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_4389:1] IVs must not be reused, IVs bit length must be larger or equal to 96
let nonceGenerator = { try VAURandom.generateSecureRandom(length: self.eciesSpec.ivSize) }

GS-A_4357

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/internal/IDPCrypto.swift:15

Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters

/// Key-pair generator type based on BrainpoolP256r1
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357,GS-A_4367] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
public typealias BrainpoolKeyGenerator = () throws -> BrainpoolP256r1.KeyExchange.PrivateKey

../Sources/IDP/internal/JWT/JWE+KDF.swift:31

Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4367] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
case bpp256r1(BrainpoolP256r1.KeyExchange.PublicKey,

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:99

Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4367] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_3#5] Brainpool key generator
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19179#5] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
let keyPairGenerator = { try BrainpoolP256r1.KeyExchange.generateKey() }

GS-A_4357-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:289

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// Validate JWT/DiscoveryDocument signature
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Only implemented for brainpoolP256r1
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Resi_6#4] Discovery Document signature verification
guard (try? fetchedDocument.backing.verify(with: fetchedDocument.discKey)) ?? false else {

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:635

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Only implemented for brainpoolP256r1
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_19908-01] Signature check
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
guard let verified = try? challenge.challenge.verify(with: document.authentication.cert),

../Sources/IDP/internal/JWT/JWTSignatureVerifier.swift:24

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207]
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02]
public func verify(signature raw: Data, message: Data) throws -> Bool {

../Sources/IDP/internal/JWT/JWTSignatureVerifier.swift:34

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207]
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
guard let key = brainpoolP256r1VerifyPublicKey() else {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:473

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Assure only brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
let alg: JWT.Algorithm = .bp256r1

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:518

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Assure only brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
guard let alg = autCertificateResponse.info.algorithm.alg

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:606

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Assure only brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
var alg: JWT.Algorithm? {

GS-A_4357-02

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:289

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// Validate JWT/DiscoveryDocument signature
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Only implemented for brainpoolP256r1
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Resi_6#4] Discovery Document signature verification
guard (try? fetchedDocument.backing.verify(with: fetchedDocument.discKey)) ?? false else {

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:635

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Only implemented for brainpoolP256r1
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_19908-01] Signature check
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
guard let verified = try? challenge.challenge.verify(with: document.authentication.cert),

../Sources/IDP/internal/JWT/JWTSignatureVerifier.swift:24

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207]
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02]
public func verify(signature raw: Data, message: Data) throws -> Bool {

../Sources/IDP/internal/JWT/JWTSignatureVerifier.swift:34

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207]
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
guard let key = brainpoolP256r1VerifyPublicKey() else {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:473

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Assure only brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
let alg: JWT.Algorithm = .bp256r1

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:518

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Assure only brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
guard let alg = autCertificateResponse.info.algorithm.alg

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:606

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Assure only brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
var alg: JWT.Algorithm? {

GS-A_4359

Original Requirement

Implementation

TLS is enforced by the platform for every HTTP connection. Certain domains can be excluded from this rule by listing them in a dedicated NSAppTransportSecurity exception list. This list is empty for our application, see also: Requirements for Connecting Using ATS

GS-A_4361-02

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:290

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// Validate JWT/DiscoveryDocument signature
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Only implemented for brainpoolP256r1
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Resi_6#4] Discovery Document signature verification
guard (try? fetchedDocument.backing.verify(with: fetchedDocument.discKey)) ?? false else {

../Sources/IDP/DefaultIDPSession.swift:635

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Only implemented for brainpoolP256r1
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_19908-01] Signature check
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
guard let verified = try? challenge.challenge.verify(with: document.authentication.cert),

../Sources/IDP/internal/JWT/JWTSignatureVerifier.swift:24

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207]
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02]
public func verify(signature raw: Data, message: Data) throws -> Bool {

../Sources/IDP/internal/JWT/JWTSignatureVerifier.swift:34

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207]
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
guard let key = brainpoolP256r1VerifyPublicKey() else {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:473

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Assure only brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
let alg: JWT.Algorithm = .bp256r1

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:518

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Assure only brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
guard let alg = autCertificateResponse.info.algorithm.alg

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/NFCSignatureProvider.swift:606

Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_17207] Assure only brainpoolP256r1 is used
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357-01,GS-A_4357-02,GS-A_4361-02] Assure that brainpoolP256r1 is used
var alg: JWT.Algorithm? {

GS-A_4367

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/internal/IDPCrypto.swift:15

Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters

/// Key-pair generator type based on BrainpoolP256r1
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357,GS-A_4367] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
public typealias BrainpoolKeyGenerator = () throws -> BrainpoolP256r1.KeyExchange.PrivateKey

../Sources/IDP/internal/JWT/JWE+KDF.swift:32

Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4367] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
case bpp256r1(BrainpoolP256r1.KeyExchange.PublicKey,

../Sources/IDP/internal/SecKeyRandom.swift:20

/// Generate random Data with given length
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4367]
/// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Rand_1#2] Secure Random generator.
///
/// - Parameters:
///   - length: the number of bytes to generate
///   - randomizer: the randomizer to be used. Default: kSecRandomDefault
/// - Returns: the random initialized Data
/// - Throws: `IDPError`
public func generateSecureRandom(length: Int, randomizer: SecRandomRef? = kSecRandomDefault) throws -> Data {

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:100

Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4367] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_3#5] Brainpool key generator
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19179#5] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
let keyPairGenerator = { try BrainpoolP256r1.KeyExchange.generateKey() }

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAURandom.swift:21

/// Generate random Data with given length
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4367]
/// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Rand_1#3] Secure Random generator.
///
/// - Parameters:
///   - length: the number of bytes to generate
///   - randomizer: the randomizer to be used. Default: kSecRandomDefault
/// - Returns: the random initialized Data
/// - Throws: `VAUError`
static func generateSecureRandom(length: Int, randomizer: SecRandomRef? = kSecRandomDefault) throws -> Data {

We use the platform provided secure random generator. iOS is FIPS 140-2 certified. The operating system uses an entropy pool with different sources, including a true random number generator from the secure enclave, that is present on every device. Security certifcates can be found https://support.apple.com/de-li/guide/certifications/apc3fa917cb49/web, including FIPS 140-2 und Common Criteria.

GS-A_4368

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/internal/IDPCrypto.swift:56

AES key generation via CryptoKit

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4389:1] 256bit GCM symmetric key
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19179#3] AES key generation via CryptoKit
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4368] AES key generation via CryptoKit
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21323#4] AES key generation via CryptoKit
aesKey: SymmetricKey = SymmetricKey(size: SymmetricKeySize(bitCount: 256))

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:152

AES key generation via CryptoKit

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4389:2] 256bit GCM symmetric key
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19179#6] AES key generation via CryptoKit
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4368] AES key generation via CryptoKit
let secretKey = SymmetricKey(data: sharedSecret)

We use the platform provided secure random generator. iOS is FIPS 140-2 certified. The operating system uses an entropy pool with different sources, including a true random number generator from the secure enclave, that is present on every device. Security certifcates can be found https://support.apple.com/de-li/guide/certifications/apc3fa917cb49/web, including FIPS 140-2 und Common Criteria.

GS-A_4385

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/HTTPClient/DefaultHTTPClient.swift:33

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4385,A_18467,A_18464,GS-A_4387]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20606#2] Setup of minimum TLS Version to use.
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20206]
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Ntwk_2#2,O.Ntwk_3#2,O.Ntwk_7#2] URLSession is used as Network Framework
urlSessionConfiguration.tlsMinimumSupportedProtocolVersion = .TLSv12

GS-A_4387

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/HTTPClient/DefaultHTTPClient.swift:33

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4385,A_18467,A_18464,GS-A_4387]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20606#2] Setup of minimum TLS Version to use.
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20206]
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Ntwk_2#2,O.Ntwk_3#2,O.Ntwk_7#2] URLSession is used as Network Framework
urlSessionConfiguration.tlsMinimumSupportedProtocolVersion = .TLSv12

GS-A_4389

Original Requirement

Implementation

2 ../Sources/IDP/internal/IDPCrypto.swift:48

IVs must not be reused, IVs bit length must be larger or equal to 96

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4389:2] IVs must not be reused, IVs bit length must be larger or equal to 96
try generateSecureRandom(length: IDPCrypto.AES256GCMSpec.nonceBytes)

1 ../Sources/IDP/internal/IDPCrypto.swift:54

256bit GCM symmetric key

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4389:1] 256bit GCM symmetric key
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19179#3] AES key generation via CryptoKit
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4368] AES key generation via CryptoKit
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21323#4] AES key generation via CryptoKit
aesKey: SymmetricKey = SymmetricKey(size: SymmetricKeySize(bitCount: 256))

2 ../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:150

256bit GCM symmetric key

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4389:2] 256bit GCM symmetric key
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19179#6] AES key generation via CryptoKit
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4368] AES key generation via CryptoKit
let secretKey = SymmetricKey(data: sharedSecret)

1 ../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:169

256bit GCM symmetric key

// f) Encrypt
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4389:1] 256bit GCM symmetric key
let sealedBox = try AES.GCM.seal(payload, using: cek, nonce: nonce)

GS-A_4390

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/AVS/AVSCmsEncrypter.swift:21

RSAES-OAEP with MGF1 implemented in sub-framework OpenSSL-swift

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4390] RSAES-OAEP with MGF1 implemented in sub-framework OpenSSL-swift
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_22778-01#3] Encryption of message to the Pharmacy is done with all provided
// certificates
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_22779-01#3] Encrypted message is of form of a PKCS#7 container (CMS)
// https://github.com/gematik/OpenSSL-Swift/blob/3c1ea91ba5abfefecfe3588815cb928d777e29ad/Sources/OpenSSL/CMS/CMSContentInfo.swift#L88
// swiftlint:disable:previous line_length
let cms = try CMSContentInfo.encryptPartial(data: data)

GS−A_5035

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use https only, see DefaultHTTPClient.swift. ATS forbids other connections.

GS−A_5322

Original Requirement

Implementation

There is no API to control the session length, developer forums suggest it is 10 minutes for iOS.

GS−A_5339

Original Requirement

Implementation

We cannot interfere with cipher suite lists, see Requirements for Connecting Using ATS for actual order.

GS−A_5526

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use the recommended NSURLSession for best network security Preventing insecure network connections

GS−A_5542

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use the recommended NSURLSession for best network security Preventing insecure network connections

gemSpec_eRp_APOVZD

A_21154

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Pharmacy/Search/PharmacySearchDomain.swift:534

If user defined filters contain location element, ask for permission

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_APOVZD:A_21154] If user defined filters contain location element, ask for permission
if filterOptions.contains(.currentLocation) {

A_21779

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/Pharmacy/ModelsR4.Bundle+Location.swift:138

delivery pharmacy

// [[REQ:gemSpec_eRp_APOVZD:A_21779] delivery pharmacy
case "498":

../Sources/Pharmacy/ModelsR4.Bundle+Location.swift:195

Map pickup pharmacy

// [[REQ:gemSpec_eRp_APOVZD:A_21779] Map pickup pharmacy
case "OUTPHARM":

../Sources/Pharmacy/ModelsR4.Bundle+Location.swift:200

Map shipping pharmacy

// [[REQ:gemSpec_eRp_APOVZD:A_21779] Map shipping pharmacy
case "MOBL":

gemSpec_eRp_FdV

A_19086

Original Requirement

Implementation

Tracking is only implemented for the purpose of Usability-Tracking. Sessions are not persisted, session ids are recreated each app startup.

A_19087

Original Requirement

Implementation

Tracking is only implemented for the purpose of Usability-Tracking. Sessions are not persisted, session ids are recreated each app startup.

../Sources/eRpApp/Tracking/ContentSquareAnalyticsAdapter.swift:13

Implementation of the opt-in usability-tracker.

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19087#2] Implementation of the opt-in usability-tracker.
final class ContentSquareAnalyticsAdapter: NSObject, Tracker {

A_19088

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingDomain.swift:189

Show comply route to display analytics usage within

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19088,A_19091-01#1,A_19092-01#2] Show comply route to display analytics usage within
// onboarding
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_3#5] Show comply route to display analytics usage within onboarding
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19089-01#2] Show comply route to display analytics usage within onboarding
case .showTracking:

A_19089-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

We do not link user session of multiple app starts, we forcefully regenerate a new user-id. Nevertheless the following still applies: Opt-In for Analytics will be asked while the app onboarding runs. After the onboarding ran, the user may change the analytics settings in the settings menu.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingDomain.swift:192

Show comply route to display analytics usage within onboarding

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19088,A_19091-01#1,A_19092-01#2] Show comply route to display analytics usage within
// onboarding
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_3#5] Show comply route to display analytics usage within onboarding
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19089-01#2] Show comply route to display analytics usage within onboarding
case .showTracking:

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsView.swift:47

Show information dialog for analytics usage

// Tracking comply sheet presentation
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_5#3] Show comply view for settings triggered analytics enabling
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19982#3,A_19089-01#3] Show information dialog for analytics usage
Rectangle()

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsView.swift:177

User info for usage analytics

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19089-01#4] User info for usage analytics
Label(title: { Text(L10n.stgTrkTxtExplanation) }, icon: {})

A_19090

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Tracking/ContentSquareAnalyticsAdapter.swift:61

activate tracking only if permitted

/// Starts tracking and calls `optIn` if permission is granted by the user.
/// Calling this method after calling `resetSessionID()` will create a new `sessionID`
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19090] activate tracking only if permitted
private func startIfPermitted() {

A_19090-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/SceneDelegate.swift:300

activate after optIn is granted

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19090-01] activate after optIn is granted
tracker.stopTracking()

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingDomain.swift:194

User confirms the opt in within settings

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19090-01,A_19091-01#2] User confirms the opt in within settings
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_3#6] Accept usage analytics
case .alert(.presented(.allowTracking)):

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsDomain.swift:165

User confirms the opt in within settings

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19090-01,A_19091-01#4] User confirms the opt in within settings
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_5#4] User confirms the opt in within settings
case .confirmedOptInTracking:

../Sources/eRpApp/Tracking/ContentSquareAnalyticsAdapter.swift:43

activate after optIn is granted

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19090-01] activate after optIn is granted
Contentsquare.start()

We do not link user session of multiple app starts, we forcefully regenerate a new user-id. Nevertheless the following still applies: Opt-In for Analytics will be asked while the app onboarding runs. After the onboarding ran, the user may change the analytics settings in the settings menu.

A_19091-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

We do not link user session of multiple app starts, we forcefully regenerate a new user-id. Nevertheless the following still applies: Opt-In for Analytics will be asked while the app onboarding runs. After the onboarding ran, the user may change the analytics settings in the settings menu.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingDomain.swift:189

Show comply route to display analytics usage within

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19088,A_19091-01#1,A_19092-01#2] Show comply route to display analytics usage within
// onboarding
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_3#5] Show comply route to display analytics usage within onboarding
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19089-01#2] Show comply route to display analytics usage within onboarding
case .showTracking:

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingDomain.swift:194

User confirms the opt in within settings

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19090-01,A_19091-01#2] User confirms the opt in within settings
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_3#6] Accept usage analytics
case .alert(.presented(.allowTracking)):

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsDomain.swift:156

Show comply route to display analytics usage within settings

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19091-01#3] Show comply route to display analytics usage within settings
state.destination = .complyTracking(.init())

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsDomain.swift:165

User confirms the opt in within settings

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19090-01,A_19091-01#4] User confirms the opt in within settings
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_5#4] User confirms the opt in within settings
case .confirmedOptInTracking:

A_19092-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

We do not link user session of multiple app starts, we forcefully regenerate a new user-id. Nevertheless the following still applies: Opt-In for Analytics will be asked while the app onboarding runs. After the onboarding ran, the user may change the analytics settings in the settings menu.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingDomain.swift:189

Show comply route to display analytics usage within

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19088,A_19091-01#1,A_19092-01#2] Show comply route to display analytics usage within
// onboarding
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_3#5] Show comply route to display analytics usage within onboarding
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19089-01#2] Show comply route to display analytics usage within onboarding
case .showTracking:

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingDomain.swift:199

User may choose to not accept analytics, onboarding will still continue

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19092-01#3] User may choose to not accept analytics, onboarding will still continue
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_3#7] Deny usage analytics
case .alert(.dismiss):

A_19093-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

Usage Tracking is called very sparse and boils down to one place where all visited screens are recorded. See usage of @Dependency(\.tracker) for all cases where the actual analytics framework is used.

../Sources/eRpApp/Tracking/AnalyticsReducer.swift:38

Very sparse usage of actual tracking boils down to this call where

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19093-01#2] Very sparse usage of actual tracking boils down to this call where
// only displayed screens are tracked
tracker.track(screen: newRoute)

A_19094-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

Usage Tracking is called very sparse and boils down to one place where all visited screens are recorded. See usage of @Dependency(\.tracker) for all cases where the actual analytics framework is used.

A_19095

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Tracking/ContentSquareAnalyticsAdapter.swift:74

resets sessionID so that on next app start a new sessionID will be created

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19095] resets sessionID so that on next app start a new sessionID will be created
Contentsquare.optOut()

A_19096-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

We do not link user session of multiple app starts, we forcefully regenerate a new user-id. Nevertheless the following still applies.

../Sources/eRpApp/Tracking/ContentSquareAnalyticsAdapter.swift:63

Remove existing sessions while starting the framework, tracking is

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19096-01#1] Remove existing sessions while starting the framework, tracking is
// never cross session.
Contentsquare.start()

A_19097-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

We do not link user session of multiple app starts, we forcefully regenerate a new user-id. Nevertheless the following still applies.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsView.swift:158

Toggle within Settings to enable and disable usage analytics

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19097-01#2] Toggle within Settings to enable and disable usage analytics
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_5#1] Toggle within Settings to enable and disable usage analytics
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_6#1] Current Analytics state is inspectable by the user
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19982#4] Opt out of analytics
Toggle(isOn: $store.trackerOptIn.sending(\.toggleTrackingTapped).animation()) {

A_19176

Original Requirement

Implementation

Authenticity is provided by the appstore and app signing. We choose secure options where possible as the default value. Where the user can choose options, we inform by presenting additional information (e.g. “storing” the login).

A_19177

Original Requirement

Implementation

An Audit Log for every FD access is available in each user profile.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/Profiles/Protocol/AuditEventsView.swift:12

View displaying the audit events

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19177#1,A_19185#2] View displaying the audit events
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_6#3] View displaying the audit events
struct AuditEventsView: View {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/Profiles/Edit/EditProfileView.swift:400

Actual Button to open the audit events

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19177#2,A_19185#3] Actual Button to open the audit events
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_6#2] Actual Button to open the audit events
NavigationLink(item: $store.scope(state: \.destination?.auditEvents,

A_19178

Original Requirement

Implementation

Is covered by our MSTG.

A_19179

Original Requirement

Implementation

Annotation in code

../Sources/IDP/internal/IDPCrypto.swift:44

Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19179#2] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_3#3] Brainpool key generator
try BrainpoolP256r1.KeyExchange.generateKey()

../Sources/IDP/internal/IDPCrypto.swift:55

AES key generation via CryptoKit

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4389:1] 256bit GCM symmetric key
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19179#3] AES key generation via CryptoKit
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4368] AES key generation via CryptoKit
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21323#4] AES key generation via CryptoKit
aesKey: SymmetricKey = SymmetricKey(size: SymmetricKeySize(bitCount: 256))

../Sources/IDP/internal/JWT/JWE+KDF.swift:36

Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_3#4] Brainpool key generator
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19179#4] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL
= { try BrainpoolP256r1.KeyExchange.generateKey() })

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:102

Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4357] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4367] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Cryp_3#5] Brainpool key generator
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19179#5] Key pair generation delegated to OpenSSL with BrainpoolP256r1 parameters
let keyPairGenerator = { try BrainpoolP256r1.KeyExchange.generateKey() }

../Sources/VAUClient/internal/VAUCrypto.swift:151

AES key generation via CryptoKit

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4389:2] 256bit GCM symmetric key
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19179#6] AES key generation via CryptoKit
// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4368] AES key generation via CryptoKit
let secretKey = SymmetricKey(data: sharedSecret)

A_19181-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

There is an opt-in option for analytics. Full app functionality is available also without opting in. The user’s choice is requested during onboarding and the user can opt-in and opt-out of analytics at any time. There are no further configuration choices. After successful authentication via health card the corresponding prescriptions, protocol data and messages are displayed.

The onboarding contains defaults that are best practices, such as using biometrics for authentication. While using the Cardwall, selecting the “save login” option results in an dialog with additional information, to let the user make informed decisions. A missing device passcode results in a dialog that is recommending the setup of a device passcode.

A_19182

Original Requirement

Implementation

In order to minimize the risk of unknown vulnerabilities in dependencies, we use different measures: We develop according to Security by Design Principles (see E-Rezept-App - SSDLC.pdf - Section Richtlinien, Vorgaben und Best Practices). We train our engineers focussing on secure design and coding best practices (see Sicherheitsschulungen.pdf). We publish our Code on Github and use a bug bounty program (https://www.gematik.de/datensicherheit -> Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Program)

See O.Source_1 for input/output validation.

A_19183

Original Requirement

Implementation

We have no implementation of any sharing mechanism of FD data.

See O.Purp_8 for usages.

A_19184

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingAnalyticsView.swift:20

Information for the user what is collected

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19184] Information for the user what is collected
VStack(alignment: .leading, spacing: 16) {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Onboarding/OnboardingDomain.swift:207

Alert for the user to choose.

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19184] Alert for the user to choose.
static let trackingAlertState: AlertState<Action.Alert> = {

A_19185

Original Requirement

Implementation

Communication with the Fachdienst is protocoled via Audit Events. The user can revise them in the Settings menu (Profile Settings).

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/Profiles/Protocol/AuditEventsView.swift:12

View displaying the audit events

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19177#1,A_19185#2] View displaying the audit events
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_6#3] View displaying the audit events
struct AuditEventsView: View {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/Profiles/Edit/EditProfileView.swift:400

Actual Button to open the audit events

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19177#2,A_19185#3] Actual Button to open the audit events
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_6#2] Actual Button to open the audit events
NavigationLink(item: $store.scope(state: \.destination?.auditEvents,

A_19186

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:17

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19186]
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19188] Deletion of data saved here is managed by the OS.
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21322] Storage implementation uses iOS Keychain
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21595] Storage Implementation
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_8#1,O.Arch_4#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_7#2,O.Data_2#2,O.Auth_13#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
class KeychainStorage: SecureUserDataStore, IDPStorage, SecureEGKCertificateStorage {

A_19187

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/VAUClient/VAUInterceptor.swift:39

VAU Bearer must be set to trigger a request

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19187] VAU Bearer must be set to trigger a request
return vauAccessTokenProvider.vauBearerToken

A_19188

Original Requirement

Implementation

session data (ACCESS_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, SSO_TOKEN, CAN) is saved in the keychain. Its deletion is managed by the OS. The key chain is sandboxed and can only be shared with other apps by the same vendor when explicitly set. All other mentioned data is deleted.

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:18

Deletion of data saved here is managed by the OS.

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19186]
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19188] Deletion of data saved here is managed by the OS.
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21322] Storage implementation uses iOS Keychain
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21595] Storage Implementation
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_8#1,O.Arch_4#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_7#2,O.Data_2#2,O.Auth_13#3] Implementation of data storage that is persisted via keychain
class KeychainStorage: SecureUserDataStore, IDPStorage, SecureEGKCertificateStorage {

A_19229-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

Audit events will be deleted when the referencing task is deleted. Cascading relationship “task -> audit event” is defined in Sources/eRpLocalStorage/Prescriptions/ErxTask.xcdatamodeld/ErxTask.xcdatamodel/contents

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/PrescriptionDetail/PrescriptionDetailDomain.swift:195

Deletion button is tapped -> delete confirmation dialog shows

// Delete
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19229-01#2] Deletion button is tapped -> delete confirmation dialog shows
case .delete:

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/PrescriptionDetail/PrescriptionDetailDomain.swift:205

Confirmation dialog was confirmed, deletion is triggered

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19229-01#3] Confirmation dialog was confirmed, deletion is triggered
case .destination(.presented(.alert(.confirmedDelete))):

A_19480

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/IDP/IDPSession.swift:26

usage of this token is limited to FD/IDP Access.

/// Subscribe to the session's IDPToken and receive the latest (session) token through this Publisher
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19480] usage of this token is limited to FD/IDP Access.
var autoRefreshedToken: AnyPublisher<IDPToken?, IDPError> { get }

../Sources/IDP/IDPStorage.swift:34

usage of this token is limited to FD/IDP Access.

/// Retrieve and set an IDP Token
/// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19480] usage of this token is limited to FD/IDP Access.
var token: AnyPublisher<IDPToken?, Never> { get }

A_19739

Original Requirement

Implementation

For TLS certificates, this is implemented by not deactivating ATS within Info.plist, path: NSAppTransportSecurity. For TI Certificates, this is implemented within the TrustStore module.

../Sources/TrustStore/TrustStoreSession.swift:19

/// Request and validate the VAU certificate
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19739]
///
/// - Returns: A publisher that emits a validated VAU certificate or an error
func loadVauCertificate() -> AnyPublisher<X509, TrustStoreError>

../Sources/TrustStore/TrustStoreSession.swift:29

/// Try to validate a given certificate against the underlying truststore.
/// An OCSP response will also be requested and checked against
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19739]
///
/// - Parameter certificate: the certificate to be validated
/// - Returns: A publisher that emits a Boolean stating whether or not the certificate could be validated.
func validate(certificate: X509) -> AnyPublisher<Bool, TrustStoreError>

A_19979

Original Requirement

Implementation

We use external services: The Apothekenverzeichnis and our analytics framework. During the communication with the pharmacy, there will be data shared via a prescription code. The requirement to this feature is described in gemSpec_eRp_FdV sectin 5.2.3.10 and 5.2.3.11.

We do not share sensitive data with third parties. See data usages within O.Purp_8 and O.Arch_2.

A_19980

Original Requirement

Implementation

The user is informed and required to accept this information via the data protection statement. Related data and services are listed in sections 5.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/DataPrivacy/DataPrivacyView.swift:14

Actual View driving the display of DataPrivacy.html

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_1#2] Actual View driving the display of `DataPrivacy.html`
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Arch_8#3] Webview containing local html without javascript
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19980#2] Actual View driving the display of `DataPrivacy.html`
struct DataPrivacyView: View {

A_19981

Original Requirement

Implementation

The user is informed and required to accept this information via the data protection statement. Related data and services are listed in sections 5.

A_19982

Original Requirement

Implementation

The agreement to the use of the analytics framework can be revoked. But other agreements cannot be revoked, since the app would not operate properly.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsDomain.swift:157

Opt out of analytics

// Tracking
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19088, A_19089-01#5, A_19092-01#4, A_19097-01#1] React to later opt-in or deactivation
// of usage analytics
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_5#2] Actual disabling of analytics
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19982#2] Opt out of analytics
case let .toggleTrackingTapped(optIn):

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsView.swift:47

Show information dialog for analytics usage

// Tracking comply sheet presentation
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_5#3] Show comply view for settings triggered analytics enabling
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19982#3,A_19089-01#3] Show information dialog for analytics usage
Rectangle()

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsView.swift:161

Opt out of analytics

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19097-01#2] Toggle within Settings to enable and disable usage analytics
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_5#1] Toggle within Settings to enable and disable usage analytics
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Purp_6#1] Current Analytics state is inspectable by the user
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19982#4] Opt out of analytics
Toggle(isOn: $store.trackerOptIn.sending(\.toggleTrackingTapped).animation()) {

A_19983

Original Requirement

Implementation

All used services except our analytics framework are permitted and attested by the Gematik and under the TI monitoring. The usage of our analytics framework is not under our control, but we exclusively send data to it and receive none.

A_19984

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/Pharmacy/FHIRClient+PharmacyOperation.swift:24

validate pharmacy data format conforming to FHIR

/// Convenience function for searching for pharmacies
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19984] validate pharmacy data format conforming to FHIR
///
/// - Parameters:
///   - searchTerm: Search term
///   - position: Pharmacy position (latitude and longitude)
/// - Returns: `AnyPublisher` that emits a list of `PharmacyLocation`s or is empty when not found
public func searchPharmacies(by searchTerm: String,

../Sources/eRpKit/ScannedErxTask.swift:48

parse task id and access code

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19984] parse task id and access code
guard let taskId = taskString.match(pattern: Self.taskIdRegex) else {

../Sources/eRpKit/ScannedErxTask.swift:103

validate data matrix code structure

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19984] validate data matrix code structure
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_1#4] actual validation by decoding into predefined structure
erxToken = try jsonDecoder.decode(ErxToken.self, from: jsonData)

../Sources/eRpRemoteStorage/FHIRClient+ErxTaskOperation.swift:246

validate pharmacy data format conforming to FHIR

/// Requests all communication Resources for the logged in user
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_19984] validate pharmacy data format conforming to FHIR
///
/// - Returns: Array of all loaded communication resources
/// - Parameter referenceDate: Communications with `timestamp` greater or equal `referenceDate` will be fetched
public func communicationResources(

A_20032-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

Note: grace period for OCSP responses is 12h

../Sources/TrustStore/X509TrustStore.swift:14

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218]
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20032-01]
// Category A: Cross root certificates
private let rootCa: X509

../Sources/TrustStore/X509TrustStore.swift:106

/// Match a collection of `OCSPResponse`s with the end entity certificates of this `X509TrustStore`.
/// Checks response status, revocation status for each certificate and validates the signer certificates of
///   the responses itself.
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:A_21218]
/// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20032-01]
///
/// - Note: This function assumes that up-to-dateness of the responses itself has already been checked.
///
/// - Returns: true on successful matching/validation, false if not successful or error
func checkEeCertificatesStatus(with ocspResponses: [OCSPResponse]) throws -> Bool {

A_20033

Original Requirement

Implementation

For TLS certificates, this is implemented by not deactivating ATS within Info.plist, path: NSAppTransportSecurity. For TI Certificates, this is implemented within the TrustStore module.

A_20167-02

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Data/PrescriptionRepository.swift:133

no token/not authorized, show authenticator module

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20167-02#2,A_20172] no token/not authorized, show authenticator module
if Result.success(false) == isAuthenticated {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Pharmacy/RedeemService/RedeemService.swift:151

no token/not authorized, show authenticator module

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20167-02#3,A_20172] no token/not authorized, show authenticator module
if Result.success(false) == authenticated {

../Sources/IDP/IDPInterceptor.swift:61

no token available, bailout

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20167-02#4] no token available, bailout
.authentication(error)

../Sources/IDP/IDPInterceptor.swift:71

invalidate/delete unauthorized token

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20167-02#5] invalidate/delete unauthorized token
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Source_5#2] invalidate/delete unauthorized token
self.session.invalidateAccessToken()

A_20172

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Data/PrescriptionRepository.swift:133

no token/not authorized, show authenticator module

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20167-02#2,A_20172] no token/not authorized, show authenticator module
if Result.success(false) == isAuthenticated {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/CardWallReadCardDomain.Environment+Profile.swift:50

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20172]
func idpChallengePublisher(for profileID: UUID) -> AsyncStream<CardWallReadCardDomain.Action> {

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/CardWallReadCardDomain.Environment+Profile.swift:75

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20172]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20526-01] sign and verify with idp
func signChallengeWithNFCCard(

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/CardWall/ReadCard/CardWallReadCardDomain.Environment+Profile.swift:107

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20172]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20526-01] verify with idp
func verifyResultWithIDP(

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Pharmacy/RedeemService/RedeemService.swift:151

no token/not authorized, show authenticator module

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20167-02#3,A_20172] no token/not authorized, show authenticator module
if Result.success(false) == authenticated {

A_20181-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

Screen that presents the DataMatrix code for redeeming a prescription only contains some static texts and the image of the code.

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/MatrixCode/MatrixCodeView.swift:17

Screen that presents the DataMatrix code for redeeming a prescription only

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20181-01#2] Screen that presents the DataMatrix code for redeeming a prescription only
// contains some static texts and the image of the code.
struct MatrixCodeView: View {

A_20182

Original Requirement

Implementation

No advertisement or similar is presented in the app. Assigning a prescription to an pharmacy in only possible via the app’s pharmacy search. Pharmacy search results are only based on search term and filter criteria set by the user.

A_20183

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/Pharmacy/PharmacyFHIRDataSource.swift:31

/// API for requesting pharmacies with the passed search term
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20183]
///
/// - Parameter searchTerm: String that send to the server for filtering the pharmacies response
/// - Parameter position: Position (latitude and longitude) of pharmacy
/// - Parameter filter: further filter parameters for pharmacies
/// - Returns: `AnyPublisher` that emits all `PharmacyLocation`s for the given `searchTerm`
public func searchPharmacies(by searchTerm: String,

../Sources/Pharmacy/PharmacyRemoteDataStore.swift:22

/// API for requesting pharmacies with the passed search term
///
/// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20183]
///
/// - Parameter searchTerm: String that send to the server for filtering the pharmacies response
/// - Parameter position: Position (latitude and longitude) of pharmacy
/// - Parameter filter: further filter parameters for pharmacies
/// - Returns: `AnyPublisher` that emits all `PharmacyLocation`s for the given `searchTerm`
func searchPharmacies(by searchTerm: String,

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Pharmacy/Search/PharmacySearchDomain.swift:396

search results mirrored verbatim, no sorting, no highlighting

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20183] search results mirrored verbatim, no sorting, no highlighting
state.searchState = .searchRunning

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Pharmacy/Search/PharmacySearchMapDomain.swift:254

search results mirrored verbatim, no sorting, no highlighting

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20183] search results mirrored verbatim, no sorting, no highlighting
return .run { [center = state.mapLocation.region.center, filter = state.pharmacyFilterOptions] send in

A_20184

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:123

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20184]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21328#3] KeychainStorage implementation
let success: Bool

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/StandardSessionContainer.swift:91

Keychain storage encrypts session/ssl tokens

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21328#2] Keychain storage encrypts session tokens
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20184] Keychain storage encrypts session/ssl tokens
storage: secureUserStore,

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/StandardSessionContainer.swift:109

No persistent storage for idp pairing session

storage: MemoryStorage(), // [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20184] No persistent storage for idp pairing session
schedulers: schedulers,

A_20185

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsDomain.swift:159

OptOut for user

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20185,A_20187] OptOut for user
state.trackerOptIn = false

Token invalidation happens after 12 hours as the IDP provied SSO-Token is no longer valid after that time.

A_20186

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/KeychainStorage.swift:248

Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20499,A_20499-1#3] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20186] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
set(can: nil)

../Sources/eRpApp/Session/ProfileSecureDataWiper.swift:41

Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN

// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20499,A_20499-01#2] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20186] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_21603] Certificate
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_14#4] Deletion of SSO_TOKEN, ID_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN
storage.wipe()

A_20187

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Settings/SettingsDomain.swift:159

OptOut for user

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20185,A_20187] OptOut for user
state.trackerOptIn = false

A_20193

Original Requirement

Implementation

Camera is only used for scanning recipes and avatar setup. CoreLocation is used for pharmacy search. Usage is requested before actual first usage, the user is asked for permission. This is also enforced by the OS.

A_20194

Original Requirement

Implementation

Camera is only used for scanning recipes and avatar setup. CoreLocation is used for pharmacy search. Usage is requested before actual first usage, the user is asked for permission. This is also enforced by the OS.

A_20202

Original Requirement

Implementation

Camera is only used for scanning recipes and avatar setup. CoreLocation is used for pharmacy search. Usage is requested before actual first usage, the user is asked for permission. This is also enforced by the OS.

A_20206

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/HTTPClient/DefaultHTTPClient.swift:35

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4385,A_18467,A_18464,GS-A_4387]
// [REQ:gemSpec_IDP_Frontend:A_20606#2] Setup of minimum TLS Version to use.
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20206]
// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Ntwk_2#2,O.Ntwk_3#2,O.Ntwk_7#2] URLSession is used as Network Framework
urlSessionConfiguration.tlsMinimumSupportedProtocolVersion = .TLSv12

A_20208

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/Pharmacy/PharmacyFHIROperation.swift:14

/// Search for pharmacies by name
/// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20208]
case searchPharmacies(searchTerm: String, position: Position?, filter: [String: String], handler: Handler)

A_20285

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Pharmacy/Search/PharmacySearchDomain.swift:405

pharmacy order is resolved on server side

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20285] pharmacy order is resolved on server side
state.pharmacies = pharmacies

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Pharmacy/Search/PharmacySearchMapDomain.swift:268

pharmacy order is resolved on server side

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20285] pharmacy order is resolved on server side
state.pharmacies = pharmacies.map {

A_20603

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/Main/PrescriptionDetail/PrescriptionDetailDomain.swift:92

Usages of matrixCodeGenerator for code generation. UserProfile is neither part of

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20603] Usages of matrixCodeGenerator for code generation. UserProfile is neither part of
// the screen nor the state.
@Dependency(\.erxMatrixCodeGenerator) var matrixCodeGenerator: ErxMatrixCodeGenerator

../Sources/eRpApp/Screens/MatrixCode/MatrixCodeDomain.swift:71

Usages of matrixCodeGenerator for code generation. UserProfile is neither part of

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_20603] Usages of matrixCodeGenerator for code generation. UserProfile is neither part of
// the screen nor the state.
@Dependency(\.erxMatrixCodeGenerator) var erxMatrixCodeGenerator: ErxMatrixCodeGenerator

A_22778-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

Encryption of message to the Pharmacy is done with/for all provided certificates/recipients.

../Sources/AVS/AVSCmsEncrypter.swift:10

Encryption of message to the Pharmacy is done for all provided recipients

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_22778-01#2] Encryption of message to the Pharmacy is done for all provided recipients
func cmsEncrypt(_ data: Data, recipients: [X509]) throws -> Data

../Sources/AVS/AVSCmsEncrypter.swift:22

Encryption of message to the Pharmacy is done with all provided

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4390] RSAES-OAEP with MGF1 implemented in sub-framework OpenSSL-swift
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_22778-01#3] Encryption of message to the Pharmacy is done with all provided
// certificates
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_22779-01#3] Encrypted message is of form of a PKCS#7 container (CMS)
// https://github.com/gematik/OpenSSL-Swift/blob/3c1ea91ba5abfefecfe3588815cb928d777e29ad/Sources/OpenSSL/CMS/CMSContentInfo.swift#L88
// swiftlint:disable:previous line_length
let cms = try CMSContentInfo.encryptPartial(data: data)

A_22779-01

Original Requirement

Implementation

Encrypted message is of form of a PKCS#7 container (CMS)

../Sources/AVS/AVSMessageConverter.swift:32

Encrypted message is of form of a PKCS#7 container (CMS)

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_22779-01#2] Encrypted message is of form of a PKCS#7 container (CMS)
// 1. Create a CMS AuthenticatedEnvelopedData structure with help from OpenSSL-swift
let cmsAuthEnvelopedData = try avsCmsEncrypter.cmsEncrypt(data, recipients: recipients)

../Sources/AVS/AVSCmsEncrypter.swift:24

Encrypted message is of form of a PKCS#7 container (CMS)

// [REQ:gemSpec_Krypt:GS-A_4390] RSAES-OAEP with MGF1 implemented in sub-framework OpenSSL-swift
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_22778-01#3] Encryption of message to the Pharmacy is done with all provided
// certificates
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_22779-01#3] Encrypted message is of form of a PKCS#7 container (CMS)
// https://github.com/gematik/OpenSSL-Swift/blob/3c1ea91ba5abfefecfe3588815cb928d777e29ad/Sources/OpenSSL/CMS/CMSContentInfo.swift#L88
// swiftlint:disable:previous line_length
let cms = try CMSContentInfo.encryptPartial(data: data)

A_24525

Original Requirement

Implementation

Whether analytics are enabled or not is persisted using UserDefaults. As these usere Defaults are empty upon installation, any call to bool(for:) will return to false. Opt-In for Analytics will be asked while the app onboarding runs.

../Sources/eRpApp/Tracking/ContentSquareAnalyticsAdapter.swift:37

Calculate if analytics are enabled or not.

// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_24525#2] Calculate if analytics are enabled or not.
userDefaults.appTrackingAllowed

A_24579

Original Requirement

Implementation

See snapshot test (e.g. ‘testPharmacySearch_searchResultSuccess.iPhone8-light.png’) or the actual app to verify.

A_24857

Original Requirement

Implementation

../Sources/eRpApp/SceneDelegate.swift:180

Present the authentication window upon every startup

// [REQ:BSI-eRp-ePA:O.Auth_8#2] Present the authentication window
// [REQ:gemSpec_eRp_FdV:A_24857#2] Present the authentication window upon every startup
// dispatching necessary to prevents keyboard not showing on iOS 16
DispatchQueue.main.async { [weak self] in